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INTRODUCTION 
Executive compensation has been the cyclical target of intense 
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criticism since the Great Depression, often attracting public ire and 
inducing Congressional action.1  After the 2008 financial crisis, CEO 
compensation reemerged as a topic of fierce debate and substantial media 
attention.2  The 2008 financial crisis proved to be the worst economic 
disaster since the Great Depression with the failure of some of the nation’s 
largest financial institutions.  In response, Congress passed the Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) in 
2010 with sweeping reforms intended to reign in excessive corporate risk 
taking.3  As part of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress tasked the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (the “Commission” or “SEC”) with amending Item 
402 of Regulation S-K, which governs executive compensation.4  The SEC 
must implement Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, requiring publicly 
traded corporations (the “registrants” or “companies”) to disclose: (1) the 
median annual compensation of all employees, except the CEO; (2) the 
annual compensation of the CEO; and (3) the ratio between these two 
compensation amounts.5  The SEC’s pay ratio disclosure rule (the “pay 
ratio rule” or “rule”) requires corporations to disclose this compensation 
 
 1.  See Joy Sabino Mullane, Perfect Storms: Congressional Regulation of Executive 
Compensation, 57 VILL. L. REV. 589, 591 (2012) [hereinafter Mullane] for a discussion of 
America’s cyclical protests against corporate compensation since the 1930s.  
 2.  The 2008 financial crisis saw its fair share of finger pointing.  Some of the major 
culprits were deregulation, faulty corporate governance, and Wall Street greed.  See Saule T. 
Omarova, Wall Street As Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 461-62 (2011) (“While it is widely accepted that Wall Street’s greed 
and financial institutions’ excessive risk-taking were the key ingredients of the fallout, many 
competing explanations are being offered,” such as the central banks pursuit of crisis-
inducing monetary policies, the negative effects of deregulatory legislation, and the 
“consumers of financial services, such as imprudent homeowners who borrowed beyond 
their ability to repay and then defaulted on their loans.” (internal citations omitted)).  See 
also Brooksley Born, Forward: Deregulation: A Major Cause of the Financial Crisis, 5 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 231, 231 (2011) (“The FCIC quite rightly concluded that failures in 
financial regulation and supervision along with failures of corporate governance and risk 
management at major financial firms were prime causes of the financial crisis engulfing this 
country in 2007 and 2008.”). 
 3.  Many politicians and academics blamed the excessive risk-taking of business 
executives, who paid their employees large bonuses which incentivized greater short-term 
profits, for precipitating the financial crisis.  See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, 
Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 274 (2010) (“Some of the incentives for 
excessive risk-taking may be undesirable from the perspective of shareholders.  For 
example, when pay arrangements reward executives for short-term gains, executives may 
have incentives to seek short-term gains even when doing so may adversely affect the 
expected long-term value of shareholder interests by creating an excessive risk of an 
implosion down the road.”). 
 4.  Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 50104, 50104 (Aug. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, and 249) [hereinafter Pay Ratio Rule] (“Section 953(b) directs the 
Commission to amend Item 402 of Regulation S–K . . . .”).  
 5.  Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50104.  
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data with annual reports, proxy solicitations,6 and any other information or 
registration statements that Item 402 of Regulation S-K requires.7  The SEC 
expects the rule to affect over 3,500 registrants in total.8  After two years 
and over 300,000 comment letters,9 the SEC adopted the final rule on 
August 5, 2015 by a 3-2 vote along party lines.10 
The debate over excessive executive compensation is not novel.  
Congress and the public have castigated corporate executives in previous 
economic crashes, and the pay ratio rule has proven to be no less 
controversial.  Historically, a high unemployment rate and economic 
recession are two of the main ingredients leading to legislative action 
against alleged excessive executive compensation.11  Thus, it was no 
surprise public criticism crested in 2009 after American International 
Group (AIG), one of the major contributors to the crisis and the recipient of 
 
 6.  Proxy solicitations are an important means for generating shareholder activism, 
such as altering corporate governance or replacing company directors.  See generally Eric 
M. Fogel et al., Public Company Shareholders Acting As Owners: Three Reforms-
Introducing the “Oversight Shareholder”, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 517, 527 (2004) (discussing 
the challenges shareholders face when using proxy solicitations to wage a proxy fight 
against corporate management to remove incumbent directors). 
 7.  Regulation S-K increases publicly available information by requiring public 
companies to disclose important corporate information, including executive compensation 
data.  Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50104 (“The disclosure is required in any annual 
report, proxy or information statement, or registration statement that requires executive 
compensation disclosure pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S–K.”). 
 8.  Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50175 (discussing the number of registrants 
believed to be subject to the rule).  See also Pay Ratio Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 60560, 60594 
(proposed Oct. 1, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229 and 249) [hereinafter Proposed 
Pay Ratio Rule] (same). 
 9.  In order for executive or independent agencies to promulgate regulations a 
“[g]eneral notice of [the] proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal 
Register . . . [and] the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 
553 (2014).  See also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, COMMENTS ON PAY RATIO DISCLOSURE, 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713.shtml (last updated Aug. 5, 2015), 
archived at https://perma.cc/4J72-7DPX (documenting the number of comments the 
Commission received in the rulemaking process). 
 10.  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules for Pay Ratio 
Disclosure (August 5, 2015) http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/VDZ4-TZ5J (announcing the adoption of the final Pay Ratio Disclosure 
Rule); Bill Chappell, SEC Adopts CEO Pay Ratio Rule, Five Years After It Became Law, 
NPR (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/08/05/429628037/sec-
to-vote-on-requiring-companies-to-disclose-ceo-pay-ratio, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Y4NK-W793 (“The SEC’s five commissioners have voted 3-2 to adopt the 
CEO pay ratio rule. Both Republicans on the panel—Daniel Gallagher and Michael 
Piwowar cited the influence of big U.S. labor unions as they voted against the rule.”).  
 11.  Mullane, supra note 1, at 624 (“[For] points in time that Congress has chosen to act 
to regulate executive pay, three factors have been present: an economic recession, a rising 
unemployment rate, and an executive pay controversy. . . .”). 
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more than $170 billion in taxpayer bailout money, revealed that it still 
expected to award over $165 million in bonuses at the same time many 
Americans faced unemployment.12 
The SEC has a long history of attempting to curtail executive 
compensation to protect shareholders and the public.  From a shareholder’s 
perspective, excessive compensation is any payment exceeding what is 
required to reduce agency costs13 and maximize executive performance.  
Attractive compensation packages can incentivize managers to exert more 
effort, guide the company in a particular path, and make business decisions 
that benefit the shareholders.14  In theory, an effective compensation 
structure can provide an added level of protection to shareholders when 
directors are unable to consistently monitor their executives.15  However, 
superfluous compensation is wasted capital that leads to less profitability, 
smaller dividends for shareholders, and lower productivity from workers.16  
 
 12.  Edmund L. Andrews & Peter Baker, At A.I.G., Huge Bonuses After $170 Billion 
Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at 1 (“The payment of so much money at a company at 
the heart of the financial collapse that sent the broader economy into a tailspin almost 
certainly will fuel a popular backlash against the government’s efforts to prop up Wall 
Street.”) 
 13.  See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 17 (2004) [hereinafter Bebchuck & 
Fried] (“The official theory of executive compensation recognizes that there is an agency 
problem in publicly traded companies with separation of ownership and control. This 
agency problem is supposed to be addressed by the [board of directors’] supervision and 
monitoring of managers . . . . The threat of board intervention is expected to curb managers’ 
tendency toward self-serving behavior, thereby reducing agency costs.”); see also Richard 
A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, If So, What If Anything Should Be Done 
About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1015 (2009) [hereinafter Posner] (using economic terms to 
define “compensation [a]s excessive when it is greater than it would be if agency costs were 
zero”). 
 14.  For example, shareholders can attach compensation to certain desired benchmarks 
relating to stock price, revenue, market share, etc.  Compensation can also incentivize 
certain corporate strategies, such as distributing profits back to shareholders rather than 
engaging in corporate empire building to increase the CEO’s own prestige and reputation.  
See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 13, at 18-20 (discussing the variety of ways shareholders 
and directors can use compensation to affect executive decision making). 
 15.  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 13, at 19 (“[A] well designed compensation 
scheme can make up for the fact that directors cannot directly monitor or evaluate many of 
their top executives’ decisions.”). 
 16.  See Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of 
Executive Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 304-05 (2009) [hereinafter 
Simmons] (discussing examples of how excessive compensation can “coincide with poor 
corporate performance and unfavorable economic conditions”); Robert E. Wagner, Mission 
Impossible: A Legislative Solution for Excessive Executive Compensation, 45 CONN. L. REV. 
549, 559 (2012) [hereinafter Wagner] (“[T]here are several deleterious effects that can arise 
from excessive salaries, including smaller dividends for shareholders, a reduction of 
earnings per share, inefficiencies within the workplace that result in a negative impact on 
worker morale, higher turnover, and increased competitiveness among workers.”). But see 
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Instead, this capital should be invested in other areas of the firm or 
distributed to shareholders.  From a societal perspective, systemic 
excessive compensation contributes to income inequality, which can 
contribute to several societal harms, from slowing economic growth to 
damaging public health.17 
One of the SEC’s chief methods for influencing executive pay has 
been through increased disclosure for shareholders.  However, these 
previous attempts to restrain executive compensation have failed.  CEO 
compensation has continued to rise with the average S&P 500 CEO pay in 
2015 growing to 20418 times the median American worker’s.19  For some 
companies, the CEO may earn over 400 times the average employee.20  In 
 
generally Christine Jolls, Fairness, Minimum Wage Law, and Employee Benefits, 77 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 47, 55 (2002) (“Workers who receive wages above the low level predicted by the 
traditional analysis may offer high levels of effort in response based on their perceptions of 
the fairness of the employers’ behavior, and employers, aware of this result, can maximize 
their profits by offering such generous wages.”).  
 17.  See Brett H. McDonnell, Two Goals for Executive Compensation Reform, 52 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 585, 586 (2008) (“[T]here are at least two very different types of 
concerns that lead to two very dissimilar goals for proposals to reform executive 
compensation.  One concern focuses on executive compensation as a problem that both 
reflects and exacerbates poor corporate governance.  The other concern focuses on executive 
compensation as a source of increasing economic, political, and social inequality.”); Richard 
Wilkinson, How Economic Inequality Harms Societies, TED (July 2011), 
https://www.ted.com/talks/richard_wilkinson/transcript?language=en, archived at 
https://perma.cc/F37L-7NHK (discussing how wealth inequality can lead to erosions in 
trust, excessive consumption, violence, physical and mental health problems, and increased 
obesity within a society).  See generally RICHARD WILKINSON AND KATE PICKETT, THE 
SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER EQUALITY MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER 49-87 (2010) 
(discussing the socially corrosive effects of extreme income inequality, such as undermining 
the trust, solidarity, and mutuality of the citizenry). 
 18.  Before the recent dip in executive compensation, the pay gap between CEOs and 
average American workers grew from 195-to-1 in 1993 to 354-to-1 in 2012 and 774 times a 
minimum wage earner in 2013. See Sarah Anderson et al., Bailed Out, Booted, Busted: A 
20-Year Review of America’s Top-Paid CEOs, INST. FOR POLICY STUDIES 4 (2013), 
http://www.ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/EE13-FINAL.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/3VQ4-78T6 (documenting the growth of the pay gap between CEOs and 
average American workers); Kathryn Dill, Report: CEOs Earn 331 Times As Much As 
Average Workers, 774 Times As Much As Minimum Wage Earners, FORBES (Apr. 15, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kathryndill/2014/04/15/report-ceos-earn-331-times-as-much-
as-average-workers-774-times-as-much-as-minimum-wage-earners/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/QJD3-JTZ3 [hereinafter Dill] (comparing the compensation of CEOs to that 
of minimum wage workers). 
 19.  See Andrew Chamberlain, CEO to Worker Pay Ratios: Average CEO Earns 204 
Times Median Worker Pay, GLASSDOOR (Aug. 28, 2015), 
https://www.glassdoor.com/research/ceo-pay-ratio//, archived at https://perma.cc/V3SS-
9JQG (discussing executive to average worker pay ratios).  
 20.  Claire Zillman, This CEO has the highest pay compared to his workers, FORTUNE 
(Aug. 6, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/08/06/highest-ceo-worker-pay-ratio/, archived at 
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response to previous failures,21 Congress and the SEC are attempting to 
influence executive pay once again.  While the SEC’s recent say-on-pay 
rule22 gives shareholders the ability to demonstrate their disapproval of 
excessive compensation, pay ratio disclosures will allow shareholders to 
analyze executive compensation within a larger context that may help them 
determine whether the compensation is reasonable and fair.23  Shareholders 
could compare their firm’s ratio with that of other firms in the same 
industry or with ratios in the past to determine the optimal ratio, that is, the 
ratio that maximizes shareholder value.24  Additionally, pay ratios may help 
 
http://perma.cc/HLA9-KVEW (“According to a Payscale report, which calculated ratios 
based on the cash compensation of CEOs at the 100 highest-grossing public companies in 
the United States in 2013, CVS CEO Larry Merlo has the highest pay compared to his 
employees: $12,112,603—422 times as much as the average CVS employee, who earns 
$28,700 per year.”). 
 21.  Although attempts to reduce executive compensation are popular and optimistic, 
Congress’ legislation never seems to successfully rein in the eye-catching compensation 
packages of America’s top CEOs.  Whether through increased tax rates or salary caps, the 
response of corporations has always been to pay more. See Mullane, supra note 1, at 613. 
(discussing how Congress’ 1993 “tax penalty provision designed to encourage companies to 
limit executive pay unrelated to performance” spurred the pace of executive compensation 
to grow faster than any other period since the Great Depression).  Congress has gone to 
great lengths to limit executive compensation in the past. See generally Mullane, supra note 
1, at 602-03 (“Congress . . . enacted legislation mandating salary caps as a condition of 
doing business with the federal government. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
(RFC) [operated between 1932 and 1957] was authorized to deny federal financial 
assistance to companies providing executives with salaries the RFC deemed 
unreasonable . . . .” (internal citation omitted)).   
 22.  The SEC say-on-pay rule requires companies to conduct a shareholder vote to 
approve the compensation of its executives.  However, the shareholder vote is only advisory 
and not binding.  See Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden 
Parachute Compensation, 76 Fed. Reg. 6010, 6010 (Aug. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, and 249) (“Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act . . . requires companies 
to conduct a separate shareholder advisory vote to approve the compensation of 
executives . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 23.  See U.S. Cong., Comment Letter on Pay Ratio Disclosure 1 (March 17, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-1550.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/GCV8-N4W7 [hereinafter Congress of the United States] (“As the Wall 
Street Reform Act was enacted more than four years ago, we believe it’s long past the time 
for the SEC to finalize this rule. . . . Disclosure of this information will help investors 
evaluate the reasonableness of CEO pay levels relative to other company employees when 
casting ‘say-on-pay’ advisory votes as is required by the Wall Street Reform Act.”).  But see 
Ctr. on Exec. Comp., Comment Letter on Pay Ratio Disclosure 4 (Dec. 2, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-572.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/AW8Y-J8M3 [hereinafter Center on Executive Compensation] (discussing 
data collected by the Center on Executive Compensation, which found that from 2010 to 
2013 “only 14 separate shareholder proposals request[ed] a pay ratio” disclosure from the 
corporation and those proposals received 93% opposition on average from shareholders). 
 24.  For example, “[t]he CEO-to-worker compensation ratio was 20-to-1 in 1965 and 
29.9-to-1 in 1978, grew to 122.6-to-1 in 1995, peaked at 383.4-to-1 in 2000, and was 295.9-
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more socially conscious shareholders determine if an executive’s 
compensation package is excessive with reference to an ethical concept of 
fairness.  Though say-on-pay alone has failed to lower executive 
compensation, pay ratios will prompt compensation comparisons with 
executives’ employees rather than just their peers.  This could give 
shareholders valuable information in a more understandable and eye-
catching format, thereby increasing the likelihood of shareholder 
activism.25  Disclosing inequitable compensation levels to the market may 
provoke investors to alter their investments to ensure their wealth is not 
misused for wasteful compensation programs and force executives to 
defend their compensation levels when compared to their peers, foreign 
counterparts, and predecessors.26 
Beyond this, however, the pay ratio’s desired benefits are not entirely 
clear.  The SEC does not provide a benchmark ratio or optimal employment 
strategy for companies to achieve.27  As the SEC noted, there was limited 
legislative history to inform the Commission’s understanding of the 
legislative intent behind Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act.28  Filling 
the void left by Congress, public commenters have highlighted many of the 
 
to-1 in 2013” according to the Economic Policy Institute. Alyssa Davis & Lawrence Mishel, 
CEO Pay Continues to Rise as Typical Workers are Paid Less, ECON. POLICY INST.(June 12, 
2014), http://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-pay-continues-to-rise/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/B67U-DE5P.  A growing trend in executive compensation may have led 
shareholders to question the efficiency of these pay structures and learn that, right after the 
peak in 2000, top executive pay constituted almost 10% of corporate earnings. See David I. 
Walker, Who Bears the Cost of Excessive Executive Compensation (and Other Corporate 
Agency Costs)?, 57 VILL. L. REV. 653, 659 (2012) (asserting that the fraction of corporate 
earnings devoted to executive compensation had grown from 5.5% between 1993 and 1995 
to almost 10% between 2001 and 2003). It is these type of inefficiencies that reduce 
shareholder value.  
 25.  Congress of the United States, supra note 23, at 1 (“Congress enacted the CEO-to-
worker pay ratio disclosure rule in response to public concern over high executive 
compensation and the need to have this information available in an understandable 
format.”). 
 26.  See Simmons, supra note 16 at 304-05 (“[H]efty levels of executive compensation, 
even in the absence of fraud or accounting irregularities, are either (i) criticized for their 
tenuous link to performance or (ii) become a rallying cry of populist concern, especially 
when they coincide with poor corporate performance and unfavorable economic 
conditions.”). 
 27.  See Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50173 (“[W]e believe that the intended 
purpose of the pay ratio disclosure is to provide shareholders with a company-specific 
metric to evaluate the [CEO]’s compensation, rather than a benchmark for compensation 
arrangements across registrants.”). 
 28.  Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50150. (“[W]hile neither the statute nor the related 
legislative history directly states the objectives or intended benefits of the provision, we 
believe, based on our analysis of the statute and comments received, that Section 953(b) was 
intended to provide shareholders with a company-specific metric that can assist in their 
evaluation of a registrant’s executive compensation practices.”). 
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potential and desired benefits of a pay ratio rule.  But the wide-ranging 
responses from commenters have failed to specify the ratio’s intended 
objective.  Although the Great Recession spurred this legislation, there was 
no one actor or behavior that could be blamed.  Instead, it was a perfect 
storm of widespread reckless behavior, only part of which included the 
information asymmetry of corporate pay structures.  Therefore, 
commenters advocate for the inclusion of different data and, thereby, 
propose rules that address a variety of different issues.  Many commenters, 
for example, argue the pay ratios’ assistance in illuminating a CEO’s 
current compensation and the board of director’s ability to limit corporate 
excess29 would improve shareholder oversight, mitigate reckless risk-
taking, increase firm value, and create more long-term stability within the 
overall market.30  Some proponents argue that using pay ratios as another 
metric to evaluate companies helps short-term investors.  The data could 
serve as a proxy for a companies’ investment in developing their human 
capital, which can reveal information on employee morale and 
productivity.31  However, if these are the goals, the rule’s effectiveness 
depends on the SEC’s ability to tailor a rule that focuses on excessive 
executive compensation by requiring the right data from companies and 
producing accurate and reliable ratios. 
Despite these goals, the SEC’s pay ratio rule will likely result in 
another failed attempt to curtail executive compensation.  Because 
Congress, through Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, mandated that 
the SEC release a pay ratio rule, an argument as to whether the rule should 
exist is futile.  Instead, this Comment focuses on the rule’s likely results by 
highlighting approaches the SEC took to mitigate some of its harmful 
effects and where the SEC failed.  In Part I, this Comment details how 
executive compensation has grown to its current levels and shows that 
 
 29.  See, e.g., Meredith Miller, Chief Corporate Governance Officer of UAW Retiree 
Medical Benefits Trust, Comment on Pay Ratio Disclosure 2 (Nov. 21, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-377.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3X3B-
MW9N [hereinafter Miller] (“The Trust would use the CEO pay ratio, together with other 
compensation disclosures in the proxy statement, to evaluate companies’ compensation 
policies and practices for purposes of proxy voting—including the management advisory 
vote on executive compensation or say on pay proposal—and identifying companies for 
engagement.”).  
 30.  For example, many institutional investors, such as pension funds, insurance 
companies, or mutual funds are especially concerned with the long-term sustainability of 
their investments and any means of improving that sustainability is generally welcomed.  
See Miller, supra note 29, at 1 (“The $58.8 billion UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust . . . 
[t]he largest non-governmental purchaser of retiree health care in the United States . . . 
depends on the creation of long-term sustainable value by the companies in which [it] 
invest[s].”).  
 31.  Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 60585.  
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previous disclosure requirements have not alleviated this growth.  Part II 
investigates the expected costs for corporations that the pay ratio rule 
affects to better understand whether the benefits justify these costs.  Part III 
investigates whether the SEC’s pay ratio rule is likely to help investors 
gauge the fairness and appropriateness of corporations’ compensation 
models, whether the pay ratio rule will contribute to corporations curtailing 
CEO compensation, and the utility of pay ratio information for shareholder 
say-on-pay votes.  Part IV discusses the greatest failures of the rule, why it 
is unlikely to achieve its desired effects, and how these failures may 
mislead shareholders and arbitrarily harm some industries more than 
others.  In its conclusion, this Comment suggests avoiding environment- 
and industry-specific factors that will significantly distort the pay ratios, 
making them less informative for the market and for those concerned with 
pay equity. 
A. The Current Rise in Executive Compensation 
Before examining the effectiveness of the pay ratio rule, it is 
important to have an understanding of how executive compensation in the 
US has risen to its current levels.  The modern corporate form protects 
investors through limited liability.  Investors can potentially increase their 
wealth without fear of losing more than what they invested.  This, in turn, 
reduces the cost of capital for the corporation.32  However, in exchange for 
this opportunity to profit from the corporation, shareholders must entrust 
corporate managers with control of their investment.33  This relationship 
creates an agency cost—an inherent risk that executives can deviate from 
 
 32.  See Chancellor William T. Allen, Ambiguity in Corporation Law, 22 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 893, 896 (1997) (“Corporation law facilitates wealth creation principally by creating a 
legal structure that makes it substantially cheaper for investors to commit their capital to 
risky ventures.  It does this through the innovation of tradable share interests, centralized 
management, limited liability, and the entity concept itself.  The interaction of these legal 
characteristics facilitates diversification of investments and centralization of management.  
This allows capital to subject itself to greater risk.  It is the ability to increase the degree of 
risk that can be rationally accepted that provides the greatest source of the efficiency of the 
corporate form.”).  For rare exceptions to shareholder limited liability, see Robert B. 
Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 
1036 (1991) (“‘Piercing the corporate veil’ refers to the judicially imposed exception to [the 
limited liability] principle by which courts disregard the separateness of the corporation and 
hold a shareholder responsible for the corporation’s action as if it were the shareholder’s 
own.”). 
 33.  The exception to this exchange is closely-held corporations controlled by owner-
managers.  For more information on the differences between closely-held corporations and 
publicly-held corporations, particularly in relation to agency costs, see generally Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 
271, 274 (1986). 
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the goals of investors.  Thus, there is a constant tension between those that 
own the company and those that control it.34 
One popular solution for alleviating this tension and correcting CEO 
incentives was implementing and increasing performance-based (or 
incentive-based) pay.35  Investors hoped including incentive-based pay in 
executive compensation packages would reduce corruption and prevent 
CEOs from personally benefitting unless the entire corporation and its 
shareholders benefitted as well.  Congress responded by implementing 
Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code to spur corporations into 
using performance-based pay.  Under the updated tax law, any 
compensation over $1 million had to be based on the company’s 
performance in order to be tax deductible.36  The tax incentive succeeded in 
driving the use of performance-based pay.37  In the last decade, 
performance-based pay through stock options became ubiquitous in public 
companies’ executive compensation packages. 
Although incentive-based compensation mitigated agency problems 
between shareholders and executives, it simultaneously induced excessive 
 
 34.  While the board of directors is expected to alleviate agency costs by preventing 
corporate corruption or mismanagement, their efforts are not always successful and their 
motivations are not always ethical. See Reed Abelson, One Enron Inquiry Suggests Board 
Played Important Role, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2002, at C1  (“The board . . . went so far as to 
suspend Enron’s code of ethics to approve the creation of the partnerships between Enron 
and its chief financial officer . . . .  The partnerships kept significant debt off Enron’s books 
and masked much of what was really going on at the company.”).  
 35.  For a discussion on common incentive-based compensation structures and how 
they can lead to unintended consequences, see Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregg D. Polsky, The 
Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 677, 680-81 (2011) (“Traditionally, the goal of pay reformers was to more 
closely link executive compensation with firm performance in order to reduce agency 
costs . . . .  [T]he benefits of incentive pay are lower than conventionally understood because 
its effects are largely redundant of incentive effects stemming from newly robust corporate 
governance mechanisms that discipline executives for poor stock performance . . . .  [These 
mechanisms include] the activism of institutional investors, the oversight by more 
demanding boards, and, most significantly, the related reduction in CEO job security . . . .”).  
See also Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 13, at 137 (“Institutional investors and federal 
regulators, with the support of financial economists, began encouraging the use of such 
[performance-based] compensation in the early 1990s.”).   
 36.  See 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(1), (4)(C) (“In the case of any publicly held corporation, 
no deduction shall be allowed under this chapter for applicable employee remuneration with 
respect to any covered employee to the extent that the amount of such remuneration for the 
taxable year with respect to such employee exceeds $1,000,000. . . . The term ‘applicable 
employee remuneration’ shall not include any remuneration payable solely on account of the 
attainment of one or more performance goals . . . .”). 
 37.  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 13, at 72 (“The enactment in the 1992 of Section 
162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code . . . was intended to encourage the use of 
[performance-based] compensation.”).  
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short-term risks through its asymmetrical rewards.38  Because companies 
used certain metrics, like stock price, to determine the CEO’s performance, 
they greatly incentivized CEOs to expand those metrics to increase their 
own compensation.39  Furthermore, executive compensation that is 
dependent on future factors creates inherent uncertainty and limitless 
potential in how much compensation the executive can earn.40  Tying pay 
to performance was Congress’ solution to corporate corruption.  Instead it 
was blamed as one of the chief contributors to the financial crisis because 
many of the stock options tied to CEO pay only correlated with short-term 
performance goals.41  Worse, the Great Recession highlighted how 
employees and other stakeholders42 can bear the costs of a CEO’s excessive 
 
 38.  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 13, at 135 (discussing how many performance-
based payment structures received tax benefits but were only weakly tied to performance). 
 39.  See Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Performance-Based 
Compensation Positively Affect Managerial Performance?, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227, 
234 (1999) (“A typical executive compensation package includes several types of 
contingent compensation, most typically short-term bonus plan payments, and one or more 
forms of long-term compensation, such as stock options and/or stock bonuses.”).  See also 
Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Corporate Governance and Executive 
Compensation: Evidence from Japan, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 111, 120 (2014) (“CEO 
compensation is higher when the CEO is also the board chair, the board is larger, there is a 
greater percentage of the board composed of outside directors, and the outside directors are 
appointed by the CEO.” (quoting John Core et al., Corporate Governance, Chief Executive 
Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 372 (1999))); Charles 
M. Yablon & Jennifer Hill, Timing Corporate Disclosures to Maximize Performance-Based 
Remuneration: A Case of Misaligned Incentives?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 83, 86 (2000) 
(“As a result of management’s powers and discretion over financial reporting and 
disclosure, even the most carefully structured pay packages frequently provide CEOs with 
incentives other than a desire to maximize shareholder value.”). 
 40.  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 13, at 19 (discussing the uncertain results that 
will come from tying an executive’s compensation to performance).  
 41.  See Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive 
Compensation for Risk Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1205, 1216 (2011) (“Two parallel 
decades-long trends—the steady march of banking deregulation and the rise of equity-based 
performance pay generally-help to explain the evolution toward the high-powered equity 
incentives for bankers that we observe pre-crisis.”).  But see, e.g., Patrick Bolton et al., Pay 
for Short-Term Performance: Executive Compensation in Speculative Markets, 30 J. CORP. 
L. 721, 724-25 (2005) (“[I]t is optimal for shareholders to offer compensation contracts that 
allow CEOs to profit early from a speculative stock price surge even if at a later date share 
prices collapse . . . . The CEO has a duty of loyalty towards current shareholders and not 
future shareholders.  Thus, if he artificially drives up the stock price in the short run at the 
expense of long-run value he may be acting in the interests of his current principals.  
Current shareholders may well choose to incentivize the CEO for short-term stock 
performance, even if they understand that this also creates incentives for the CEO to 
manipulate earnings.  The reason is simply that current shareholders want the CEO to 
pursue their interests even if this comes at the expense of future shareholders.”).  
 42.  For a discussion on the relationship between shareholders, stakeholders, and 
companies, see Lance Moir et al., Measuring the Business Case: Linking Stakeholder and 
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risk-taking.  These realizations then galvanized support for increased 
regulation—such as the pay ratio rule—to mitigate overly risky corporate 
practices.43 
Because the effectiveness of incentive-based compensation has 
diminishing returns where, at a certain point, the increase in performance-
based compensation is not worth the reduction in agency costs—and may 
even counter shareholder interests by inducing reckless risk taking—
shareholders and directors must calibrate the metrics in order to produce 
the most desirable and efficient incentives.  Thus, the system relies on 
effective oversight by shareholders and directors to determine when 
increased compensation is no longer worth the additional costs and that the 
compensation continues to incentivize the desired results.44  But 
 
Shareholder Value, 7 CORP. GOVERNANCE: THE INT’L J. OF BUS. IN SOC’Y 388, 388 (2007) 
(“The traditional neo-classical economic view suggests that the objective of the firm is to 
maximize shareholder value and that this should be its objective function.  An opposing 
view . . . is that we need to rethink the purpose of the firm as being a social institution that 
needs to create value for stakeholders. . . . [I]f a firm does not pay attention and satisfy its 
multiple stakeholders, whether those be the dominant ones in the short-term of customers 
and employees or, in the longer run, wider society as evidenced by global communities and 
governments, it will cease to be legitimate.”). 
 43.  Letter from Sue Ravenscroft, Professor of Accounting, Iowa State Univ., to Kevin 
O’Neill & Lynn Powalski, Deputy Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (June 18, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-973.pdf, at 1, archived at 
http://perma.cc/9REZ-JTYY [hereinafter Ravenscroft] (“Section 953(b) of Dodd-Frank 
reflects legitimate concerns arising since the latest financial crisis about risk-sharing and 
about whether what Adam Smith called the ‘grand bargain’ is still being honored.  That is, 
do all employees who contribute to the success of a company enjoy the perquisites of 
success? . . . On the down side, when firms make risky decisions, are CEOs or workers 
(and-in the recent crisis–displaced and under-water homeowners) the ones who bear the 
costs?”).  See also William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against 
Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 659 (2010) (discussing the excessive 
risk taking “at the heart of the capitalist system” that failed to internalize systematic risks 
that led to the 2007-’08 economic recession). 
 44.  CEOs in particular are more difficult to manage through incentive-based 
compensation structures than other workers.  It is difficult to grade a CEO’s performance 
based on the performance of the entire firm because, in many instances, the CEO cannot 
realistically oversee every facet of the company’s operations.  As the number of operations 
and projects underneath a manager increases, more external factors and unpredictable 
variables influence the firm’s success.  Therefore, compensation based on the company 
stock price encapsulates much more than the CEO’s performance, such as the general 
market performance.  To illuminate the problem with an example, it would be akin to 
evaluating the President’s performance based off the country’s gross national product 
(GNP).  While there may be correlations, it is not always so simple.  Conversely, a low-level 
manager may only oversee a small team and rely on a handful of individuals to complete 
any task.  With a reduction in external factors and unpredictable variables between a low-
level manager and his subordinates, a performance-based system is more effective.  See 
Posner, supra note 13, at 1026 (“The [President-GDP] analogy is particularly close in an 
industry like oil, in which the profits of an oil company are largely a function of the price of 
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determining which metrics and levels of compensation are most efficient in 
mitigating agency costs is very difficult.45 
A company’s board of directors—tasked with overseeing the effective 
use of performance-based compensation—is an unreliable supervisor.  
First, it is common for the board of directors to include the corporate 
executives of other corporations with their own financial stake in 
maintaining healthy corporate salaries.46  CEOs also often serve on their 
own board, creating a clear conflict of interest.47  Second, many CEOs 
influence the director nomination slate.48  This influence fails to insulate 
directors from a potential quid pro quo relationship with the executives 
they are supposed to supervise.49  Even after directors are elected, CEOs 
can influence director compensation through the position of board member 
or board chair.50  While director compensation is usually determined by a 
 
oil, over which the companies have little control.”). 
 45.  See Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of 
Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 749 (2013) (“Directors recognize the need 
for performance-based pay, but struggle with the selection of appropriate performance 
metrics and the identification of suitable time frames.”). 
 46.  See Posner, supra note 13, at 1023 (“The problem [of effective oversight] is 
exacerbated by the fact that a board of directors is likely to be dominated by highly paid 
business executives, including CEOs of other companies.  They have a conflict of interest, 
since they have a financial stake in high corporate salaries, their own salaries being 
determined in part by the salaries paid to persons in comparable positions in other 
companies.”). 
 47.  For a discussion of whether director independence improves firm performance or 
prevents excessive CEO compensation, see, e.g., Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of 
Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 461 (2008) (“The data indicate that independence does 
not lead to improved firm performance and may even be associated with sub-optimal 
performance.” (citing Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1530 (2005))).  See also Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value 
and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1503-04 (2007) (“The empirical evidence 
on the compensation effects of independent directors is equivocal, with ‘little evidence that 
independent directors do a better job than inside directors in establishing CEO pay.’” 
(quoting Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board 
Compensation and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW 921, 931 (1999))). 
 48.  For examples of management and directors using nomination requirements to limit 
shareholders’ ability to vote, see generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Director Nominations, 
39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 117 (2014) (discussing shareholders’ right to nominate candidates).  
 49.  Wagner, supra note 16, at 559.  
 50.  Wagner, supra note 16, at 559-560.  Wagner also notes that outside and 
“independent” third parties are not necessarily any better at providing objective 
recommendations for executive compensation.  Firms specializing in compensation 
consultation often provide other services for the firm, which are hired and compensated by 
the very same corporate executives whose salaries they are supposed to objectively evaluate.  
In one example, a consulting firm, which was hired to assist a compensation committee, 
recommended a 48% compensation increase for the CEO.  However, significant conflict of 
interest concerns arose when the same consulting firm was receiving hundreds of millions of 
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compensation committee made up of independent directors, the CEO’s 
significant power over firm resources can still influence independent 
directors in several ways, such as through donating firm assets to the alma 
matter or charities of directors, granting compensation on top of director 
fees, or doing business with the firms of directors.51  Thus, it is no surprise 
that these quid pro quo relationships have led to a correlation between 
higher CEO compensation and higher director compensation, regardless of 
firm performance.52  Another potential limitation is that directors may not 
objectively negotiate with managers over their pay because of personal 
relationships, a fear of awkwardness, or a subjective view that their 
managers are better than most—after all, they did hire their managers.53 
Unfortunately, shareholders do not fare much better when it comes to 
oversight.  Shareholders face a collective action problem.54  Though they 
 
dollars in other services for the CEO.  For information on how CEOs can influence the 
compensation of directors, see Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 13, at 30 (“As the company 
leader, usually as a board member, and often as board chair, the CEO has some say over 
director compensation.”).  See also Arthur Levitt, Jr., Corporate Culture and the Problem of 
Executive Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L. 749, 750 (2005) (discussing how this close 
relationship between executives and their directors could lead to a larger cultural problem).  
Directors often serve on multiple boards that can become fraternal in nature, giving each 
member an elite badge of prestige.  Because individuals like being invited to join this small 
club and want to be re-invited, they may fear upsetting executives, id.  
 51.  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 13, at 28-29 (discussing the actual independence 
of independent directors).  
 52.  See Ivan E. Brick et al., CEO Compensation, Director Compensation, and Firm 
Performance: Evidence of Cronyism?, 12 J. OF CORP. FIN. 403, 417 (2006) (“CEO and 
director compensations are positively correlated even after correcting for many other 
factors.  The question then is why? One possible reason . . . is that CEO and director 
compensation levels are positively related to firm complexity [and the needed managerial 
effort] . . . .  An alternative explanation is that the positive relation between these variables 
reflects cronyism, whereby the board and CEO are more concerned with selfish objectives 
than with protecting shareholder interests.”).  
 53.  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 13, at 31-32 (discussing the social and 
psychological factors, such as friendship, loyalty, and collegiality, that can affect the 
objectivity of directors when setting executive compensation levels).  
 54.  Collective action is the idea that, to further the interests of a group, individuals 
must sometimes act collectively.  Yet, collective action can be difficult to achieve: 
Free riding is one particular problem that can stymie collective action.  In situations where 
the benefits of collective action accrue to all the members of the group regardless of who 
contributed to its provision, individuals may reason that they are better off not contributing 
to the collective cause and instead free rid[e] on the efforts of others.  The problem is that if 
everyone in a group reasons in this way, then no collective action will occur . . . .  
KEITH DOWDING, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POWER 119 (2011).  Collective action problems extend 
as far back as the days of Aristotle.  See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 57 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 
Dover Publications 2000) (“That all persons call the same thing mine . . . is 
impracticable . . . . For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care 
bestowed upon it. . . . [E]verybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects 
another to fulfill . . . .”). 
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maintain the power to elect directors, they are often too dispersed to 
effectively monitor directors on routine business activities, such as setting 
CEO compensation.  Inadequate supervision over directors exacerbates 
directors’ role in holding executives accountable.  In other words, 
“[m]onitors who are not monitored are imperfect agents of their principal, 
and so in the absence of effective monitoring of directors by the 
shareholders, boards have weak incentives to limit CEO compensation.”55 
Despite Congress’ efforts to reduce agency costs, Section 162(m) 
incentivized reckless behavior and soaring compensation levels.56  One 
view is that incentive-based pay failed because there has not been sufficient 
disclosure to shareholders.  Without such disclosure, shareholders are 
unable to pressure directors to alter compensation structures.  Therefore, 
proponents of the pay ratio rule argue that increasing shareholders’ access 
to compensation data will curtail wasteful compensation packages by 
making shareholders more knowledgeable and active in the debate over 
executive compensation. 
B. Role of Public Disclosure 
Transparency is a vital component in maintaining market discipline 
and preventing the fraud and speculation that leads to market crashes.57  
Mandatory disclosure facilitates much of that transparency.58  Because 
 
 55.  Posner, supra note 13, at 1023. 
 56.  See Lisa M. Fairfax, Sue on Pay: Say on Pay’s Impact on Directors’ Fiduciary 
Duties, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 8 (2013) [hereinafter Fairfax] (“[T]he average annual CEO pay 
at S&P 500 companies increased from $850,000 in 1970 to more than $14 million in 2000-
an increase driven largely by the practice of awarding stock options and restricted stock.”). 
 57.  The SEC enacted the first executive compensation disclosure requirements in the 
Securities Act of 1933.  Leigh Johnson et al., Preparing Proxy Statements Under the SEC’s 
New Rules Regarding Executive and Director Compensation Disclosures, 7 U.C. DAVIS 
BUS. L.J. 373, 376 (2007) [hereinafter Johnson] (reviewing the history of executive 
compensation and related disclosure before 1992).  The Act required companies to disclose 
the compensation of directors and officers, along with the identity of officers earning more 
than $25,000 in compensation. Johnson at 378. 
 58.  Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open Meeting to 
Propose Amendments Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (May 20, 
2009), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch052009tap.htm, archived at 
https://perma.cc/5PZT-GLFE (“Mandatory disclosure is at the core of the federal securities 
laws.  Through mandatory disclosure, for example, the federal securities laws facilitate 
market discipline as a means of holding boards and management accountable.”).  Though 
disclosure is a fairly popular and, therefore, convenient remedy for Congress, it has been 
unsuccessful in curtailing executive compensation.  See Wagner, supra note 16, at 555 
(“Unfortunately, lawmakers have a tendency to go into ‘crisis-mode’ and have ‘knee-jerk’ 
regulatory reform responses in times of economic turmoil.  As a result, many of the previous 
remedies to executive compensation, such as increased disclosure, which seemed to be 
‘uncontroversial,’ not only failed to reduce compensation but arguably increased it.”). 
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firms can develop new methods of circumventing regulatory attempts to 
limit executive compensation, solutions to overcompensation must be 
equally innovative.  Thus, empowering shareholders to see and readily 
react as the corporate environment changes may be the best solution to 
tackling excessive compensation.  If shareholders believe a company is 
engaged in wasteful or risky spending, they can elect new directors or sell 
their stock.59  However, in order for shareholders to play this role 
effectively, they must be informed.60  Through periodic reports and public 
offering documents, the SEC has greatly alleviated the information 
asymmetry between corporate insiders and more vulnerable, passive 
investors.61  The hope is, as more information is unveiled, shareholders can 
use that information to make smarter investments and induce changes in 
corporate governance.62  Included in these disclosures are the compensation 
packages of corporate executives.  In theory, the more information 
shareholders receive on executive compensation, the better they will be at 
identifying inefficient compensation levels—or, in other words, 
compensation above what is required to eliminate agency costs.63 
In an honest effort to help shareholders through increased disclosure, 
Congress has instead exacerbated the problem.  Disclosing compensation 
data may actually be escalating the problem of excessive executive 
 
 59.  Protesters can also shame and protest overly paid executives to try and induce 
change.  
 60.  Arthur Levitt, Jr., Corporate Culture and the Problem of Executive Compensation, 
30 J. CORP. L. 749, 750-51 (2005) (“[W]e need better disclosure of executive compensation.  
There are far too many ways for boards to . . . ‘camouflage’ executive compensation from 
the eyes of shareholders.”).  
 61.  Since the 1933 Act, the SEC has sought to create “greater transparency in the 
compensation decision making process by providing shareholders and boards of directors 
with clear and comparable information about compensation with which they could make 
more informed decisions.”  Kathryn J. Kennedy, Excessive Executive Compensation: Prior 
Federal Attempts to Curb Perceived Abuses, 10 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 196, 236 (2010) 
[hereinafter Kennedy].  See Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate 
Governance: You Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1335-36 (1996) 
[hereinafter Lowenstein] (discussing how increased transparency helps to inform investors 
in making investment decisions). 
 62.  See Lowenstein, supra note 61, at 1335-36 (“Our disclosure policies were adopted 
in order to make Wall Street fair and efficient.  They also give substance to shareholder 
rights by providing the information essential to their exercise.  But quite apart from these 
intended benefits, good disclosure has been a most efficient and effective mechanism for 
inducing managers to manage better.”). 
 63.  See Kennedy, supra note 61, at 236 (“In 2006, the SEC revised disclosure rules in 
order to shed light on how compensation decisions were made and the particulars of 
executive compensation packages.  The intent of the new rules was to require greater 
transparency in the compensation decision making process by providing shareholders and 
boards of directors with clear and comparable information about compensation with which 
they could make more informed decisions.”). 
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compensation by informing CEOs if they are paid less than their peers.  
They can then leverage this information in negotiating their own pay.  
CEOs often argue that they are worth the expense because of their unique 
ability to create jobs and improve shareholder value and, therefore, should 
not have their compensation judged against other, lower paying industries 
or occupations.64  Following this line of reasoning, CEO compensation is 
not problematic—for either the CEO or the shareholders—unless it 
significantly deviates from other, similarly situated CEOs.65  But once a 
CEO’s compensation is compared to other CEOs within their market, even 
their relative wage may carry great personal significance—when “the Wall 
Street Journal published a list of the world’s wealthiest people [for 
example], only one person on that list was happy . . . .”66 Therefore, a 
CEO’s high absolute wage may not diminish the desire to out earn peers 
and may instead fuel a wasteful cycle of competitiveness. 
On the other hand, decreasing disclosure is counterintuitive and may 
go against modern capitalist thinking.  Though this Comment does not 
advocate for decreasing current federally-imposed disclosure requirements, 
the ineffectiveness of emphasizing disclosure as a panacea seems to be 
clear: the SEC’s perpetual revisions and increased disclosure requirements 
reveal the limited and futile role executive compensation disclosures have 
in reducing CEO pay.67  Therefore, it is important to weigh the costs and 
potential results of more disclosure, rather than simply assuming that more 
is always better.68  The SEC’s attempt to improve shareholder knowledge 
 
 64.  Compare Myths and Realities of Executive Pay: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Fin., 107th Cong. 28 (2002) (statement of Ira Kay, Vice President & U.S. Practice Dir. For 
Exec. Comp., Watson Wyatt Worldwide, N.Y.C., NY) (discussing the level of CEO pay in 
the context of their contribution and in relation to other high paying markets, such as sports 
and entertainment), with Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 13, at 21 (“[C]lubs . . . generally do 
not provide athletes with complex deferred-compensation arrangements [or] . . . gratuitous 
payments in addition to the player’s contractually entitled payouts” when they are released.). 
 65.  But see Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 13, at 22 (“[While some argue that] 
compensation arrangements should not be seen as problematic as long as boards use market 
surveys . . . . the validity of [these] arguments for deference to market outcomes depends on 
whether those outcomes are largely generated by arm’s-length negotiations . . . .”). 
 66.  Posner, supra note 13, at 1035. 
 67.  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 13, at 68 (analyzing how previous “disclosure 
requirements have hardly brought an end to firms’ ability to camouflage the amount and 
form of executive pay.”). 
 68.  See Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other 
Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 480-81 (2007) [hereinafter Manne] (“[T]here 
must be a limit to the extent and scope of required disclosure.  From the point of view of 
information recipients, the additional disclosures provide diminishing returns and increasing 
costs, some of which may be born directly by the recipient, most notably when the recipient 
is a stockholder in a company subject to the disclosure regulation.  At the same time, 
additional disclosure also imposes increasing costs on firms, and even if we accept the 
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and power through required disclosure of corporate compensation 
demonstrates how disclosure can fail and may even inadvertently aggravate 
the problem.  Will disclosing pay ratios be any different? 
I. COSTS OF THE PAY RATIO RULE 
Even if the pay ratio is effective in achieving its desired goals, its 
added value must be worth the added costs of producing it.  Increased 
disclosure inherently means increased costs for corporations.  The two 
largest costs for registrants with complex corporate or employment 
structures will be calculating the necessary information for the pay ratio 
disclosure and the potential liability exposure for releasing inaccurate 
ratios. 
Along with determining which employees are used to calculate the 
median worker’s compensation,69 a company must determine their wages.  
For some registrants, obtaining this data will be a major difficulty.  While 
disclosing the compensation of high-level executives is not difficult, many 
public companies lack a centralized database of all employee wages, 
making disclosure of the median wage much more problematic.70  
However, the final rule includes several alterations from the SEC’s initial 
proposal that help to reduce these regulatory burdens, such as allowing 
registrants to exclude unconsolidated subsidiaries and allowing them to 
identify the median employee once every three years. 
Although costs of implementing the new pay ratio rule will vary 
among individual companies, the SEC anticipates the rule to cost 
$1,314,694,544 in total and $368,159 for the average registrant.71  The 
 
argument that firms voluntarily under-produce information, an optimal information 
disclosure regime would surely not require disclosure of all private information.  Optimal 
disclosure is not maximal disclosure.”).  Furthermore, increased disclosure is only helpful if 
that information is read and disseminated into the marketplace.  See Manne, at 503-04 
(“Although the SEC focuses on the importance of information for ordinary investment 
decisions, ordinary investors are rationally uninterested in such information.  It is well-
known that stockholders are relatively uninformed and apathetic in their roles as ‘owners’ of 
public companies: Small stakes, diversification, and attenuated influence render the 
acquisition and use of most firm-specific information far more costly than they would be 
worth.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 69.  See Sections IV-A and IV-C for a discussion on which employees are included in 
the pay ratio calculation.  
 70.  Ctr. on Exec. Comp., Comment Letter on Pay Ratio Disclosure 4 (Sept. 26, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-1043.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/3N6J-LL9X (“Because most companies do not have centralized pay or 
employee information, the pay ratio calculation will require a large manual data collection 
effort with companies having to evaluate their entire workforce . . . .”). 
 71.  Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50161 (estimating the initial cost of compliance 
for all 3,571 registrants and the average registrant affected by the Section 953(b) 
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Commission also estimates “that the total incremental cost of [utilizing] 
outside professionals for annual reports will be approximately 
$315,389,390 per year and the total incremental internal burden will be 
approximately 2,367,563 hours per year.”72  However, opponents like the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce challenge these numbers and argue that the 
SEC’s analysis has underestimated some of these costs by as much as 
nearly 200%.73  Some of the major factors influencing costs differences are: 
[The] size and nature of the workforce, complexity of the 
organization, the stratification of pay levels across the workforce, 
the types of compensation the employees receive, the extent that 
different currencies are involved, the number of tax and 
accounting regimes involved, the number of payroll systems the 
registrant has, and the degree of difficulty involved in integrating 
payroll systems to readily compile total compensation 
information for all employees.74 
For example, a medium-sized company with a primarily American 
workforce may face fewer hurdles and costs than a large multinational 
company with thousands of employees across the globe.75  Because of these 
costs, opponents of the rule argue that the rule’s burdens and inefficiencies 
overshadow any potential benefits, especially when the information likely 
misleads shareholders.76  Furthermore, the rule risks putting US companies 
at a competitive disadvantage against foreign corporations that do not have 
 
requirements).  See Table 1 in Appendix for further cost details.   
 72.  See Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50182. 
 73.  See Tom Quaadman, Vice President of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Comment 
Letter on Pay Ratio Disclosure (May 22, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-
13/s70713-969.pdf at 2, archived at http://perma.cc/7UXP-83FJ  (discussing how the SEC 
likely underestimated the cost of utilizing outside professionals, with annual costs to the 
private sector of over $700 million versus the $315.4 million estimated by the SEC in its 
final rule and the $72.7 million estimated in its proposed rule).  
 74.  Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50173. 
 75.  See Proposed Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 8, at 60601 (“[T]he actual burden will 
vary depending on factors including the size of the company, the number of employees and 
how many are located outside of the United States.”). 
 76.  Kevin Douglas & Andrea Orr, SEC’s CEO pay-Ratio Proposal Gives Companies 
Flexibility to Satisfy Dodd-Frank, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 11, 2013), 
http://www.bna.com/secs-ceo-pay-ratio-proposal-gives-companies-flexibility-to-satisfy-
dodd-frank/, archived at http://perma.cc/BN9P-9HA9 [hereinafter Douglas] (“[O]pponents 
note that, even within a single industry, median employee pay can vary based on numerous 
factors, including differences in organizational structures, geographical distribution of 
employees and degree of reliance on seasonal and outsourced workers.  Opponents also 
argue that any benefit to investors from the pay ratio disclosure is far outweighed by the 
difficulties and time-consuming exercise of calculating median employee pay, especially for 
companies with large diverse workforces, multiple payroll and other compensation systems 
and global operations.”). 
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to expend the extra resources in compiling compensation data. 
A. Gathering Employee Wage Information for Complex Corporate 
Structures 
The rule endeavors to eliminate advantages of unique corporate 
structures by including employees of subsidiaries.  Otherwise, companies 
could utilize their subsidiaries to hide employee data and alter pay ratios.  
The SEC did, however, heed commenters’ warnings and define 
“‘employee’ to include only the employees of the registrant’s consolidated 
subsidiaries.”77  Otherwise, many corporations with several unconsolidated 
subsidiaries, or subsidiaries with separate financial information, would face 
increased costs in retrieving the necessary data from each separate 
subsidiary.  Even holding companies with more than 50% ownership over a 
subsidiary are not necessarily actively controlling it.  Both management 
and the employees of the parent company and unconsolidated subsidiary 
may view themselves as belonging to discrete corporate entities.  For these 
reasons, parent companies would have a much more difficult time 
retrieving and converting the data for unconsolidated companies because 
they often lack convenient access to the relevant financial information. 
Still, large, international holding companies may face significant 
regulatory burdens in retrieving the requisite employee data.  The SEC 
relied on the compliance costs of previous executive disclosure rules to 
estimate the costs for disclosing median workers’ compensation.78  
However, estimating the cost of executive pay for the 2006 disclosure 
regulation, for instance, is much less burdensome than determining the 
average pay of median employees.  Some large, complex corporations have 
multiple HR departments, each with their own payroll information.79  These 
 
 77.  Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50112 (emphasis added).  Unconsolidated 
subsidiaries are companies owned, at least in part, by a holding company. However, unlike 
consolidated subsidiaries, unconsolidated subsidiaries’ financial statements are not included 
with those of the holding company. Instead, the unconsolidated subsidiary is treated as an 
investment of the parent company, rather than an appendage of its greater operations. See 
JONATHAN LAW, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ACCOUNTING 423 (4th ed. Oxford University Press 
2010) (defining unconsolidated subsidiary as “[a]n undertaking that, although it is a 
subsidiary undertaking of a group, is not included in the consolidated financial statement of 
the group”). 
 78.  Center on Executive Compensation, supra note 23, at 11 (“The SEC’s cost 
estimates for calculating the pay ratio are erroneously based on the Commission’s 
unsubstantiated speculation that the compliance time for the proposed pay ratio rule will be 
two times the compliance hours estimate it estimated for the 2006 compensation disclosure 
changes.”). 
 79.  Id. at 10 (discussing one proposed method of using multiple HR teams in various 
countries and regions to complete the requisite data collection).  
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companies will have to manually collect data from each separate 
database.80  Although the SEC predicted it would take twice as long to 
determine the pay of median employees as opposed to executives, some 
corporations fear a much higher multiple is more accurate.81  Furthermore, 
multinational companies will now have to implement teams in each country 
rather than just their headquarters in order to collect the necessary data.82 
Some corporations do, however, have access to this information 
already.  In a comment to the SEC, Intel’s VP of Legal and Corporate 
Affairs reduced her original cost estimate for complying with the rule from 
$250,000-$500,000 to $15,000 annually.83  What led to such an extreme 
 
 80.  The final rule did, however, address concerns over international privacy laws.  
Many commenters warned that “data privacy restrictions in certain countries will add to the 
time and expense required to identify the median employee. . . . [C]ompliance with the data 
protection laws of each European Union member country will be a significant obstacle to 
the collection of necessary information.”  Center on Executive Compensation, supra note 
23, at 10.  The final rule “provides an exemption for circumstances in which foreign data 
privacy laws or regulations make registrants unable to comply with the final rule.”  Pay 
Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50111.  Nevertheless, registrants must still pay the cost of: 
seeking an exemption or other relief under any governing data privacy laws or 
regulations . . . . [and] obtain a legal opinion from counsel that opines on the inability of the 
registrant to obtain or process the information necessary for compliance with the final rule 
without violating that jurisdiction’s data privacy laws or regulations . . . .  
Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50111. 
 81.   Center on Executive Compensation, supra note 23, at 11 (“The SEC’s cost 
estimates for calculating the pay ratio are erroneously based on the Commission’s 
unsubstantiated speculation that the compliance time for the proposed pay ratio rule will be 
two times the compliance hours estimate it estimated for the 2006 compensation disclosure 
changes [requiring disclosure of executive and director compensation]. . . . The development 
of the named executive officer disclosure is largely manual, involving a relatively small 
team, typically at company headquarters as opposed to locations in countries across the 
globe. . . . ‘[I]dentifying the median employee and calculating total compensation will 
require education of team members in these countries, developing a process for collection of 
the information, ensuring that the information is reliable, and identifying the median 
employee among all employees.’”). 
 82.  Center on Executive Compensation, supra note 23, at 11 (comparing the named 
executive officer disclosure to the disclosure requirement involving employees located 
across the globe).  It is worth noting that numerous large, multinational corporations sent a 
combined comment seeking several changes to the proposed rule but did not seek to exclude 
foreign employees.  Some of the companies in the combined comment include Microsoft, 
Pfizer, Verizon, Johnson & Johnson, and Morgan Stanley.  They did, however, recommend 
excluding unconsolidated subsidiaries, which may accomplish the same objective if those 
subsidiaries hire a large number of foreign employees.  For a full list of commenters and 
their proposed amendments, see generally Keith Nelsen, General Counsel of Best Buy Co., 
et al., Comment Letter on Pay Ratio Disclosure (Dec. 17, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-660.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/2GYY-JEJC (Discussing the commenters proposed amendments). 
 83.  Cary Klafter, VP Legal and Corporate Affairs for Intel, Comment Letter on Pay 
Ratio Disclosure 1 (Nov. 27, 2013) http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-
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decrease?  Intel already recorded the W-2 forms (and their foreign 
equivalents) for its 105,000 employees.84  This was possible because the 
SEC allows companies to implement a methodology that works best for 
each individualized company’s situation, such as utilizing data gathering 
systems that are already in place or taking a statistical sample of workers.  
The Intel example highlights how even large, multinational corporations 
with tens of thousands of employees worldwide can efficiently comply 
with the disclosure rule.85  However, many other companies do not have the 
same luxury. 
B. Use of Reasonable Estimates and Assumptions 
It is difficult for some companies to calculate the median wage, even 
if they do have access to the necessary data.  To lessen this financial burden 
of calculating the pay ratio, the SEC’s pay ratio rule allows for registrants 
to use reasonable estimates and assumptions in their calculations.86  The 
SEC hopes to limit costs by allowing corporations to implement 
customized methodologies, like statistical sampling, that best fit an 
individual company’s needs, so long as the methodology is reasonable and 
consistent.87  Just how much freedom companies have, however, is the 
source of much concern.  Certain adjustments and assumptions, such as 
full-time equivalent adjustments for part-time workers88 and annualizing 
adjustments for temporary or seasonal employees89, are not permitted.  In 
 
658.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8BBM-JB78. 
 84.  Id. (“This reduction is primarily due to the ability afforded by the proposed rule for 
registrants to use a consistently applied compensation measure, such as payroll records or 
W-2 reportable wages and the equivalents for non-U.S. employees, to identify the median 
employee.”). 
 85.  Id. (“Accordingly, [Intel] would be spared from the burdensome and costly task of 
calculating the compensation of each of [its] employees (approximately 105,000 persons 
worldwide) pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K in order to identify [its] median 
employee for the purpose of determining the pay ratio.  The cost of computing the change in 
the present value of pension benefits for all of [Intel’s] employees would have been 
particularly costly and time consuming.”).  
 86.  See Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50141 (discussing registrants’ ability to use 
estimates and assumptions as long as they “briefly describe and consistently apply any 
methodology . . . .”) 
 87.  See Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50135 (discussing the final rule’s flexibility in 
determining the median employee). 
 88.  “A full-time equivalent adjustment involves taking the compensation of a part-time 
employee and projecting what the employee would have made if the employee were 
employed on a full-time basis.  Full-time equivalent adjustments are prohibited under the 
final rule under all circumstances.”  Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50129. 
 89.  Temporary workers are excluded because: 
Annualization involves taking the compensation of an employee who worked for only part 
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its final rule, the SEC attempts to strike a balance between implementing 
methods that reduce costs while still presenting useful and accurate 
information to shareholders. 
One example is the use of random sampling to determine the median 
employee’s compensation.  Rather than finding the compensation and in 
kind compensation of every employee, the company would only calculate 
the information for randomly selected employees.  In the SEC’s initial 
proposal, the Commission believed simple random sampling would suffice 
for about half of the registrants subject to the pay ratio rule because their 
compensation structure naturally had a tractable statistical distribution.90  
However, sampling may be more difficult for the other half of registrants 
with multiple business or geographical segments.91  In the Center on 
Executive Compensation’s survey92 of 128 public companies, only 16.8% 
believed they would use statistical sampling.93  Many voiced concerns over 
not having enough information within their systems to conduct an effective 
statistical sample.94  The survey suggests sampling will not be as 
convenient for some companies as the SEC submits. 
But beyond the example of random sampling, the rule gives little 
guidance in calculating the compensation of employees.95  The SEC does 
“not prescribe specific estimation techniques or confidence levels for an 
estimated median because [according to the SEC] . . . companies would be 
 
of the registrant’s fiscal year and projecting that compensation as if the employee worked 
the full fiscal year at the schedule that the employee worked for the portion of the year the 
employee worked.  Annualization is allowed under the rule for full-time and part-time 
employees who did not work for the registrant’s full fiscal year for some reason . . . . 
Annualization is only allowed for permanent employees . . . .  
Id. 
 90.  Proposed Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 8, at 60594 (estimating that about 50% of the 
nearly 4,000 registrants have an organizational structure with a tractable statistical 
compensation distribution).  
 91.  See id. (“[G]enerating reasonable estimates through statistical sampling could 
result in a disproportionally higher cost to registrants with more complicated payroll 
systems or organization structures.”).  
 92.  In the survey, 5% of companies had revenues greater than $100 billion, 54% had 
revenues between $10 and $100 billion, 30% had revenues between $2 and $10 billion, and 
11% had revenues less than $2 billion.  Center on Executive Compensation, supra note 23, 
at Appendix 1, ii. 
 93.  Id. at 10. 
 94.  See id. at 10-11 (“Several [potential registrants] noted that they do not currently 
track pay information at the level of detail required by the rule. . . . Others noted that the 
scope of their businesses made developing a sample challenging. . . . ‘A statistically valid 
random sample of the workforce would need to consider various factors, including the 
distribution of compensation data across the organization, employees (full-time, part-time, 
seasonal and temporary), geographies, lines of business, etc.’”). 
 95.  For example, “[t]he final rule does not provide specific parameters for statistical 
sampling, including the appropriate sample size.”  Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50136. 
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in the best position to determine what is reasonable in light of their own 
employee population and access to compensation data (emphasis added).”96  
And the Commission does not define “reasonable” techniques because it 
believes companies should “make their own determinations on what is 
appropriate based on their own facts and circumstances.”97  Furthermore, in 
terms of valuing unique pay structures or in kind compensation, the 
Commission does “not believe it would be practicable . . . to provide 
detailed, prescriptive rules on valuing particular types of employee 
compensation.”98  Instead, the Commission provides companies with 
latitude to utilize estimates and assumptions to create their own 
methodologies for determining the median employee’s pay.  The SEC 
believes that “mandating a particular methodology would [not] necessarily 
improve the comparability across companies because of the numerous other 
factors that could also cause the ratios to be less meaningful for company-
to-company comparison.”99  In other words, the SEC understands that the 
plethora of variables affecting these ratios already makes comparability so 
difficult, that allowing any methodology (within reason) could not make 
the ratios much more inaccurate than they already are. 
Despite its failure to provide detailed and efficient methodologies, the 
final rule greatly improves upon the SEC’s initial proposal by allowing 
companies to identify their median employee once every three years, 
instead of every year.100  If the SEC is incapable of reducing the burdens of 
determining the median employee, it can at least decrease the frequency.  
Furthermore, if the median employee leaves the company, the registrant 
can simply use another employee who has substantially similar 
compensation until the three year mark is met.101  While it is a simple 
nuance to the proposed rule, it will greatly reduce costs for large 
companies. 
The SEC’s acceptance of estimates, sampling, and reasonable 
assumptions in calculating the ratio is crucial.  First, the rule’s requirement 
that registrants gather the pay of their CEO and median employee so that a 
ratio of the two can be disclosed will be a difficult and expensive enterprise 
for many companies.102  There has already been a noticeable shift in 
 
 96.  Proposed Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 8, at 60570.  
 97.  Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50136. 
 98.  Proposed Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 8, at 60574. 
 99.  Proposed Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 8, at 60594.  
 100.  See Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50172 (“[T]he final rule allows registrants to 
identify the median employee once every three years unless there has been a change in the 
registrant’s employee population or employee compensation arrangements that it reasonably 
believes would result in a significant change in the pay ratio disclosure.”). 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  The cost of determining the median compensation can vary widely depending on 
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companies seeking to stay private longer due to the increasing burdens and 
liabilities of going public.103  If the rule does not sufficiently allow for 
companies to minimize costs, it will further discourage companies from 
going public, reducing their access to capital and reducing the number of 
lucrative investment opportunities for investors.104  Second, by allowing 
different industries and corporations to implement the calculation practices 
that work best for their circumstances, the SEC would encourage a “natural 
laboratory from which best practices can emerge from experience, peer 
benchmarking, and investor and stakeholder dialog[ue].”105  Therefore, the 
SEC’s flexibility through assumptions and estimates will prove essential 
for both managers and shareholders.  However, flexibility lacking 
guidance, coupled with registrant’s fear of liability, will nullify much of the 
flexibility the SEC’s hopes to create. 
C. Liability Risks 
The SEC, along with some large public corporations, argue that the 
rule gives registrants enough flexibility to reduce costs by implementing 
customized and efficient methods for calculating the information.  
Nevertheless, the requirement that companies “file” rather than “furnish” 
their pay ratios, which imposes greater liability for inaccuracies, 
 
the size and complexity of the workforce and the type of compensation received.  See 
generally Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50161 (noting a varying degree of indirect costs 
especially on public companies with overseas employees, subsidiaries, or low-wage 
workers).  See also Proposed Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 8, at 60570 (listing the particular 
facts and circumstances that affect the appropriate and most cost effective methodology for 
identifying the median compensation); Ctr. on Exec. Comp., Comment Letter on Pay Ratio 
Disclosure 5 (Sept. 26, 2014) (“[U]nlike officer pay programs, when calculating the pay 
ratio, shifts in calculation methodologies and employee populations will ensure high 
continued compliance costs.”). 
 103.  See James Angel, Associate Professor of Finance at Georgetown University, 
Comment Letter on Pay Ratio Disclosure (Nov. 22, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-347.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/A6M8-K6V6 [hereinafter Angel] at 6-7 (“As this rule imposes costs on 
public companies but not private ones, it is likely to tip the balance further away from the 
public markets.  The alarming decrease in the number of public US companies is a sign that 
our markets have not been receptive to smaller public companies.  Adding more burdens to 
public companies but not private ones adds yet another reason for the companies to remain 
or go private. . . . This crisis in capital formation is one of the things that led Congress to 
pass the JOBS Act subsequent to Dodd-Frank.”). 
 104.  Id. (“This withering of the public markets creates fewer choices for growing 
companies to access needed capital, and fewer exit opportunities for venture capital 
investors.”).  
 105.  John Seethoff, VP and Deputy General Counsel for Microsoft, Comment Letter on 
Pay Ratio Disclosure (Dec. 4 2013) http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-604.pdf 
at 3, archived at http://perma.cc/WP7M-53ZS [hereinafter Seethoff]. 
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undermines much of this flexibility.106 
The difference between “filing” and “furnishing” is substantial.  By 
filing information to the SEC, rather than furnishing it, the information is 
subject to liability for any false or misleading statements.  While there may 
still be penalties for furnishing unreliable information, the bar for liability 
is higher.  Though “registrants will have to review a large amount of data 
and make a significant number of estimates, assumptions, and judgment 
calls,”107 they still face the possibility of litigation arising from inaccurate 
filings of the pay ratio.108  And without the existence of a safe harbor from 
the SEC, the filing requirement greatly concerns those registrants that 
believe some level of imprecision is inevitable.109  While an overwhelming 
number of companies would rather furnish the disclosure rather than file it, 
the SEC stands by the filing requirement. 
In response to the numerous objections, the SEC maintains that the 
companies concerned with limiting liability can warn shareholders of 
possible imprecisions in their disclosures110 and are free to choose 
methodologies less likely to produce misleading information.111  For 
companies with centralized systems of employee information already in 
 
 106.  See Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50143 (“Although we recognize that 
identifying the median employee and calculating total compensation may require registrants 
to review a large amount of data and make a significant number of estimates, assumptions, 
and judgment calls, we do not believe this fact alone justifies exempting this information 
from being ‘filed.’”).  See generally EDWARD M. WELSH, MORRISON & FOERSTER, 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT FORM 8-K 6 (2015), 
http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/FAQ-Form-8-K.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/WN4P-6XMV (“Section 18 of the Exchange Act imposes liability for 
material misstatements or omissions contained in reports and other information filed with 
SEC.  By contrast, reports and other information that are ‘furnished’ to SEC (to the extent 
expressly permitted under applicable SEC rules) do not attract liability under Section 18.”). 
 107.  Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50143. 
 108.  See Proposed Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 8, at 60580 (“We note that one of the 
reasons that commenters recommended treating the information as furnished and not filed is 
because of the difficulty that some companies may have in determining and verifying the 
information, which must be covered by the certifications required for Exchange Act filings 
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.”). 
 109.  See Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50143 (“Some noted that this imprecision will 
subject a registrant to potential liability and litigation, make it difficult to validate the 
information sufficiently for Sarbanes-Oxley Act certification purposes, and/or not permit the 
information to be audited . . . .”). 
 110.  See Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50143 (“[T]he required disclosure about the 
assumptions and methodologies underlying the calculations, will permit registrants to 
clearly explain to shareholders where potential imprecisions may be introduced into the 
reported statistic.”). 
 111.  See Proposed Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 8, at 60597 (highlighting how companies 
can use reasonable estimates and develop individualized compliance procedures when 
gathering and verifying information for a filing). 
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place, disclosing accurate information may not present a major hurdle.  But 
for companies lacking that luxury, they may be forced to use methods ill-
suited and inefficient for their business.  Large, decentralized companies 
relying on too many assumptions and estimations—even if they are 
educated deductions—could expose themselves to undeserved liability.112  
Therefore, the filing requirement undermines much of the flexibility the 
SEC claims to offer.  Corporations that do not already have systems in 
place to calculate median employee compensation will have to develop 
new methods of obtaining that information in order to avoid potential 
litigation.113 
In addition, a furnishing requirement may also allow companies 
freedom to discover which methods produce the most accurate and efficient 
results.  They could “leverage the efficiency of existing systems and 
processes” or experiment with different techniques without the constant 
fear of litigation.114  Furthermore, reducing the risk of liability may reduce 
the amount of boilerplate clauses full of redundant legalese that makes 
finding material information more time consuming for stakeholders.115  The 
SEC should encourage more concise disclosures to better inform the 
market.116  A “filing” requirement creates the opposite incentive. 
II. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF THE PAY RATIO RULE 
The pay ratio rule strives to inform stakeholders on the issues of pay 
 
 112.  See Center on Executive Compensation, supra note 23, at 27 (“[H]aving to obtain 
Sarbanes-Oxley certification for the pay ratio is likely to undermine the flexibility on which 
the Commission relies in its attempt to lessen the burdens of being a filed document and 
result in significant additional administrative burdens and compliance costs.”).  
 113.  See Center on Executive Compensation, supra note 23, at 27-28 (discussing how a 
filing requirement is not compelled by the statutory construction of the Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act).  
 114.  Seethoff, supra note 100, at 3. 
 115.  See Angel, supra note 103, at 7 (“Often, the material [in corporate disclosures] is 
so repetitive that it is easy to overlook the important points.  This drives up costs for 
investors and results in poorer understanding in the marketplace.”).  
 116.  The amount of information corporations disclose continues to increase every 
decade.  See Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 599, 607 (2013) [hereinafter Davidoff] (“The federal securities laws have also 
continued to emphasize disclosure.  Professor Jeffrey Gordon documented the increase in 
length of disclosure documents from 1950 to 2004.  During that time period, the average 
number of pages from a sample of Fortune 500 company 10-Ks went from almost sixteen 
pages to a little over 166 pages with the average number of financial pages increasing from 
4.41 to 38.15 pages.  From 1974 to 2004, the number of MD&A pages went from 1.88 to 
24.05. The increasing length of disclosure documents reflects the increasing emphasis on 
disclosure in federal regulations.”). 
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equity and investor value.117  Supporters of the pay ratio rule—including 
unions, labor advocates, and institutional investors—believe the growing 
disparity in wages may lead to lower company morale, productivity, and 
profitability, all of which harm firm value.118  The rule may also alleviate a 
broader societal problem concerning growing income inequality.  With the 
recent recession, Americans feel they are earning less and less while “CEO 
pay balloons and corporate profits soar.”119  Lastly, pay ratio information 
could serve as a useful tool for shareholder say-on-pay voting.  If 
disclosing the pay ratio increases firm value through greater shareholder 
activism and increased competition for more efficient payment structures, 
firms will become stronger, creating a healthier and more stable market. 
A. Pay Ratio Information May Help Shareholders Evaluate Firm 
Value 
Proponents of the rule assert that releasing pay ratio information to 
shareholders may contribute to better evaluations of CEO’s performance 
and whether it merits current compensation levels.120  Currently, 
shareholders are able to compare the compensation packages of CEOs 
across companies and relay their dissatisfaction through proxy solicitations 
and yearly say-on-pay votes.121  Information on the earnings of employees 
 
 117.  See, e.g., Pay Ratio Disclosure Comment Letter Type B, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (last updated Oct. 12, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-
190.htm, archived at https://perma.cc/8AZ9-3KT4 [hereinafter Comment Letter Type B] 
(“Disclosing corporate pay ratios between CEOs and average employees will finally show 
which corporations are driving this [pay inequity] trend, which siphons money away from 
investors, and into the pockets of CEOs.”).  
 118.  See Douglas, supra note 76 (“Supporters of the mandated disclosure, including 
unions and labor advocates, claim the CEO pay ratio constitutes material information for 
investors, particularly in light of the widely reported increase in income disparity in the U.S. 
between CEO pay and that of rank-and-file workers and the corresponding impact such 
disparity may have on employee morale and productivity.”).  See also Alex Edmans, Does 
The Stock Market Fully Value Intangibles?  Employee Satisfaction and Equity Prices, 101 J. 
OF FIN. ECON. 621, 621 (2011), http://faculty.london.edu/aedmans/Rowe.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/EVK7-69QH [hereinafter Edmans] (suggesting that employee satisfaction is 
positively correlated with shareholder returns).  
 119.  Comment Letter Type B, supra note 117. 
 120.  See supra quote accompanying note 118. 
 121.  See Randall S. Thomas et. al., Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay: Will It Lead to A Greater 
Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1213, 1215 (2012) 
(“The Act mandates that public shareholders have an advisory vote on the prior year’s 
compensation of the corporation’s top five executives—a ‘say on pay.’”).  The goal of say-
on-pay is to allow shareholders to fire a warning shot to directors if they are dissatisfied 
with inefficient pay structures.  However, a “warning shot is effective only if it can be 
followed by more serious firepower.”  Jeremy Ryan Delman, Structuring Say-on-Pay: A 
Comparative Look at Global Variations in Shareholder Voting on Executive Compensation, 
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within different industries is also available to investors, though 
accessibility may vary widely depending on the industry and the specificity 
desired.122  Nevertheless, without the rule, shareholders are not entitled 
access to data comparing the pay between a specific company’s CEO and 
its employees.123  Arguably, this information helps investors compare 
companies’ human capital investment, which can help shareholders 
determine firm value.124 
The professed importance of increasing shareholder value by investing 
in the company’s human capital has developed significantly in the last 
several decades.125  Some common examples include improving employee 
morale and satisfaction.  Under the traditional model, managers relied only 
on labor efficiency and daily output as the indicators of successful 
employee management.126  Managers often viewed corporate profits and 
employee wages as having a zero-sum relationship.127  Today, there is a 
much greater interest in corporate responsibility, whether that involves a 
 
2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 583, 624 (2010).  Unfortunately, even if shareholders believe 
compensation is excessive, removing directors can be very difficult due to dispersed 
shareholders, staggered boards, and costly proxy solicitations.  Therefore, some critics argue 
that say-on-pay is just another failed attempt to curtail executive compensation.  
 122.  See Angel, supra note 103, at 2 (citing the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which gives 
the average compensation in various industries based on the type of employment).  But see 
Proposed Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 8, at 60585 (“Company-specific information about 
median employee pay would be new information generated pursuant to the Section 953(b) 
requirements, and thus the potential incremental benefits identified by commenters 
primarily derive from this company-specific information.”). 
 123.  Proposed Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 8, at 60584. 
 124.  See Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50153 (“[C]ommenters suggested that a 
comparison of [CEO] compensation to employee compensation could be used by 
shareholders to approximate employee morale and/or productivity or analyzed as a measure 
of a particular registrant’s approach to managing human capital.”). 
 125.  See generally JACK J. PHILLIPS, INVESTING IN YOUR COMPANY’S HUMAN CAPITAL: 
STRATEGIES TO AVOID SPENDING TOO LITTLE—OR TOO MUCH (American Management 
Association, 2005) for typical examples of management techniques focusing on human 
capital investments.  
 126.  FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 1 
(Harper & Brothers Publishers 1911), http://www.eldritchpress.org/fwt/t1.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/CR24-L9MH [hereinafter Taylor] (“[M]aximum prosperity for each 
employé means not only higher wages than are usually received by men of his class, but, of 
more importance still, it also means the development of each man to his state of maximum 
efficiency. . . .”). 
 127.  See Edmans, supra note 118, at 622 (“Traditional theories . . . are based on the 
capital-intensive firm of the early 20th century, which focused on cost efficiency. . . . [J]ust 
like other inputs such as raw materials, management’s goal is to extract maximum output 
while minimizing their cost.  [Employee s]atisfaction arises if employees are overpaid or 
underworked, both of which reduce firm value.”).  See also Taylor, supra note 126, at 1 
(“The majority of [employers] believe that the fundamental interests of employés and 
employers are necessarily antagonistic.”). 
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greater concern over social issues, public policy, or stakeholders.128  Recent 
studies have found “a strong, robust, positive correlation between 
[employee] satisfaction and shareholder returns.”129  For example, since 
1998, Fortune magazine has released a list of the “100 Best Companies to 
Work For in America.”130  These companies “exhibit significantly more 
positive earnings surprises and stock price reactions to earnings 
announcements . . . . [E]ach year, they earn 1.2-1.7% more than peer 
firms.”131  There are numerous theories on how increased employee 
satisfaction improves shareholder value.  It can lower turnover, increase 
recruitment, engender employees to internalize corporate goals, and serve 
as a motivating force pushing employees to increase outputs.132  
Corporations can also receive indirect value from increasing employee 
benefits.  While many industries do not face significant consumer pressure 
to improve employee benefits, there are instances of consumers demanding 
that companies improve their labor practices.133  Just as some shareholders 
prefer to invest in socially responsible companies, some customers prefer to 
patronize companies that treat their employees well.134 
 
 128.  See generally Janet E. Kerr, The Creative Capitalism Spectrum: Evaluating 
Corporate Social Responsibility Through A Legal Lens, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 831, 832 (2008) 
(“Welcome to the age of corporate conscience. . . . The pursuit of this ‘double bottom line’ 
is supported by existing corporate laws that allow boards to consider stakeholders other than 
shareholders; the growing body of knowledge on measuring social impacts qualitatively and 
quantitatively; and the increasing demand by consumers, investors, and governments for 
sustainable and responsible business practices.”). 
 129.  Edmans, supra note 118, at 622.  
 130.  See 100 Best Companies to Work For, FORTUNE (2015), http://fortune.com/best-
companies/, archived at http://perma.cc/3Y9T-7ZGB. 
 131.  Edmans, supra note 118, at 622.  
 132.  Edmans, supra note 118, at 624.  
 133.  See DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 78-79 (The Brookings Institution 2005) [hereinafter 
Vogel] (“In July 1996, Life magazine published a story about child labor in Pakistan, which 
featured a photo of a 12-year-old boy stitching a Nike soccer ball. . . . A subsequent report 
by students at Dartmouth’s Tuck School of Business, commissioned by Nike. . . . found that 
factory workers [in Vietnam] had significant discretionary income—enough to purchase 
items such as bicycles and wedding gifts for family members—[but] it was the contrast 
between the daily wages of $1.67 paid to factory workers in Vietnam and the retail price of 
$150 for a pair of Nike’s basketball sneakers that caught the public’s attention.”). 
 134.  For example, Starbucks brands their coffee with a Fair Trade label, guaranteeing an 
above-world-market price for their producers; Ikea prohibits its suppliers from employing 
children; and Timberland grants employees one week of paid leave every year to work with 
charities.  See Vogel, supra note 133, at 1, 16-17 (discussing how companies focusing on 
corporate social responsibility to improve employee morale or company reputation will be 
in a better position to attract and retain loyal customers).  For an example of how investing 
in stakeholders can improve a company’s reputation, see World’s Most Ethical Companies - 
Honorees, ETHISPHERE (2015), http://ethisphere.com/worlds-most-ethical/wme-honorees/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/K9QX-575U (honoring companies that conduct business 
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Proponents of the pay ratio rule assume investors will utilize the new 
pay ratio information and invest accordingly.135  This theory that increased 
disclosure will help investors evaluate firms inherently relies on a semi-
strong form efficient market that instantaneously impounds and reflects all 
information in its stock prices.136  Yet, empirical studies show that a 
company’s investment in human capital usually does not affect stock price 
until it translates into tangible profits.137  Although improving employee 
satisfaction can increase output and long-term firm value, most investors 
fail to fully appreciate the financial benefits of these initiatives.138  For 
example, the earnings surprises of the 100 companies on Fortune’s list are 
significantly better than their peers.139  Yet, firms that stay on the list slowly 
experience a mispricing correction over the next several years after 
investing in employee satisfaction, meaning that these firms are 
undervalued for several years.140  So why are shareholders not investing in 
these companies when evidence shows investing in human capital can lead 
to increased firm value? There are two potential explanations.  Either (1) 
the market understands the value of human capital investments but is 
unaware of particular firms’ investment in employee satisfaction or (2) the 
market is unconvinced that investing in human capital will increase returns. 
Strong correlations between high employee satisfaction and greater 
long-term value make it unlikely that shareholders are simply unaware that 
investments in human capital can improve firm value.  However, one study 
suggests that shareholders are unconvinced and that they commonly view 
increases in union benefits solely as a cost to the company with no net 
 
ethically beyond what is expected). 
 135.  See Pay Ratio Disclosure Comment Letter Type G, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
(last updated Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-311.htm, 
archived at https://perma.cc/R7ND-PJUZ (“[I]nvestors have a strong need for such 
information . . . in order to evaluate a company’s long-term soundness.  It is widely 
acknowledged that runaway pay practices, linked to short-term corporate gains, encourage 
recklessness, excessive short- termism [sic] and unethical acts.”). 
 136.  See Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970) (“[T]he ideal is a market in which. . . . investors can choose 
among the securities that represent ownership of firms’ activities under the assumption that 
security prices at any time ‘fully reflect’ all available information. . . . [In semi-strong form 
markets] prices efficiently adjust to other information that is. . . . publicly available (e.g., 
announcements of annual earnings, stock splits, etc.). . . .”). 
 137.  Edmans, supra note 118, at 629.  
 138.  See Edmans, supra note 118, at 629-30 (hypothesizing that employee satisfaction is 
not immediately capitalized because of the intangibility of such a factor’s effect on firm 
value).  
 139.  Edmans, supra note 118, at 630.  
 140.  Edmans, supra note 118, at 631-32 (“[T]he drift dies out in the fifth year. . . . 
because the market has learned of their valuable intangibles.”). 
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returns.141  For market valuations “changes in union wealth are offset by 
opposite changes in shareholder wealth of the same magnitude, on 
average.”142  Therefore, at least some employee benefits are not valued by 
shareholders, and the market may view some types of investments in 
human capital as more valuable than others.  While shareholders expect 
union benefits to harm firm value, other benefits, like tuition 
reimbursement, may increase firm value. 
Shareholders may also view the importance of human capital 
differently with different industries.  For some sectors, where innovation, 
creativity, and independent thinking play an important role, investment in 
human capital is essential to running a successful business.143  For other 
industries, the optimal employment strategy may rely on maintaining low 
labor costs.144  In addition, while increased satisfaction through a reward 
 
 141.  See John M. Abowd, Collective Bargaining and the Division of the Value of the 
Enterprise 41 (Nat’l Bur. of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 2137, 1987) [hereinafter 
Abowd], http://www.nber.org/papers/w2137.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2JMN-N36Q 
(“Shareholders do not expect to recoup additional union wage cost in the form of extra 
productivity since they expect to bear the full financial burden of any unexpected 
increases.”).  
 142.  Abowd, supra note 141, at 42. 
 143.  See, e.g., Ken Silverstein, Energy Companies Now Investing in Human Capital and 
Generating Jobs, FORBES (Mar. 1, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2013/03/01/energy-companies-now-investing-in-
human-capital-and-generating-jobs/, archived at https://perma.cc/3VBS-KR34 
(“The economy is bouncing up and enabling energy companies to prepare for the next round 
of prosperity.  As such, they are investing not just in their businesses but also in their local 
school systems to build human capital.”); Human Capital for Agriculture in Africa THE 
WORLD BANK (Mar. 2014), http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/03/05/000442464_
20140305150314/Rendered/PDF/857130BRI0WB0H00Box382147B00PUBLIC0.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/3CTK-DDD7 (“The low level of human capital in Africa’s 
agricultural sector remains a significant constraint to growth, poverty reduction, and food 
security on the continent.”).  But see Stuart C. Carr & David McLoughlin, Effects of 
Unreasonable Pay Discrepancies for Under- and Overpayment on Double Demotivation, 
122  GENETIC, SOC., & GEN. PSYCHOLOGY MONOGRAPHS 477, 477 (“Compared with 
equitably paid workers, employees who felt they were being under- or overpaid reported 
lower job satisfaction and greater readiness to change jobs.  The results provide 
experimental support for double demotivation, which is relevant not only to international 
development cooperation but also to Western enterprise bargaining [and] merit pay. . . .”). 
 144.  For some successful industries, investment in human capital is extremely low.  See 
SYLVIA A. ALLEGRETTO, ET AL., FAST FOOD, POVERTY WAGES: THE PUBLIC COST OF LOW-
WAGE JOBS IN THE FAST FOOD INDUSTRY 1 (2013), 
http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/pdf/2013/fast_food_poverty_wages.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/RRW8-H7PX (“More than half (52 percent) of the families of front-line 
fast-food workers are enrolled in one or more public programs, compared to 25 percent of 
the workforce as a whole. . . . People working in fast-food jobs are more likely to live in or 
near poverty.  One in five families with a member holding a fast-food job has an income 
below the poverty line, and 43 percent have an income two times the federal poverty level 
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system, like bonus pay, could motivate employees to work harder, rewards 
have diminishing returns.145  Workers can only increase output by so much.  
Once this point is reached, further employee benefits will only increase 
corporate costs.  Therefore, shareholders may only invest in companies that 
effectively invest in human capital until it no longer improves outputs. 
If different benefits garner differing views from shareholders, a broad 
pay ratio that includes salary and all forms of in kind benefits may not be 
very helpful in evaluating companies.  While one firm may invest heavily 
in human capital to increase its pay ratio, it may not be in an industry 
where human capital is essential to increasing performance or the 
expenditures may not be the form of investment in human capital that 
shareholders value.  Alternatively, if investors continue to value human 
capital investments under a traditional, zero-sum model, a lack of 
information is not the problem.  Shareholders will continue to use other 
metrics to evaluate firm value instead.  There is some evidence that 
shareholders do not greatly value human capital investments, generally.  
For example, despite having access to the list of companies with the 
greatest human capital investments through Fortune Magazine’s “widely 
respected and highly publicized” “100 Best Companies to Work For in 
America” employee survey, investors still undervalued these firms.146 
On the other hand, if shareholders do not invest in companies with 
high employee satisfaction because they are simply unaware that these 
companies value their human capital more than others do, disclosing the 
pay ratio can improve company valuations and make a more information-
efficient market.  Pay ratio information could add data to the total mix of 
material information shareholders rely upon in making their investment 
decisions.  Proponents of the rule sent thousands of letters to the SEC 
during the notice-and-comment period, hoping the rule would reveal which 
corporations wastefully spend corporate dollars on executive compensation 
at the shareholders’ expense instead of reinvesting it back into the 
corporation and its workforce.147  But even if pay ratios can highlight 
 
or less.”). 
 145.  See Taylor, supra note 120, at 27 (discussing how rewards can “be effective in 
stimulating men to do their best work”).  But once they have reached their best, why give 
employees more rewards?  
 146.  See Edmans, supra note 118, at 638 (discussing the market’s failure “to incorporate 
intangible assets fully into stock valuations” and the possibility that these long-run 
investments in human capital are not valued by shareholders).  
 147.  See, e.g., Pay Ratio Disclosure Comment Letter Type A, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (last updated Sept. 25, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-
30.htm, archived at https://perma.cc/SSR7-YS79 (“Knowing which corporations heap riches 
upon their executives while squeezing struggling employees also will be a useful 
factor . . . .”); Pay Ratio Disclosure Comment Letter Type B, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
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material information to the market, the ratios must be meaningful and 
quantifiable to succeed.  Increasing information on employee satisfaction 
alone may not improve the company if there is an inability of traditional 
valuation models to incorporate these kinds of intangibles.148  Moreover, if 
the pay ratios are flawed and detached from any corporate governance 
strategies because of other external variables, the rule may actually impair 
firm valuations. 
B. Pay Ratio Information May Curtail Executive Compensation 
Proponents of the rule assert that limiting excessive compensation 
may not just increase value for investors, but may also improve a broader 
public policy concern over income inequality.  Public opinion polls reveal 
that most Americans and institutional investors believe that current 
executive compensation levels are too high.149  For many investors, social 
concerns over company practices can play a role in their investment 
decisions.150  For these socially conscious investors, information on pay 
 
(last updated Dec. 2, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-850.htm, 
archived at https://perma.cc/RY7M-57RS (“American workers are more productive than 
ever, but, year after year, studies show working Americans earning less and less . . . .”); Pay 
Ratio Disclosure Comment Letter Type C, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (last updated Oct. 
16, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-231.pdf, archived at 
https://perma.cc/S3B8-ZHMB (“High pay disparities inside a company can impair employee 
morale and productivity . . . .”); Pay Ratio Disclosure Comment Letter Type D, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n (last updated Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-
13/s70713-241.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/EP7Q-UKAN (“Disclosure of the pay ratios 
will help the capital markets better allocate capital to those companies that invest in their 
workforces.”); Pay Ratio Disclosure Comment Letter Type E, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
(last updated Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-247.htm, 
archived at http://perma.cc/8WN4-B49C (“I believe CEO pay must be put into perspective 
with pay levels throughout a company’s employees.”). 
 148.  See Ruth Sullivan, Will the SEC Pay-Ratio Rules Help Shareholders?, 
BLOOMBERG, Aug. 25, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-25/will-the-
sec-pay-ratio-rules-help-shareholders-, archived at http://perma.cc/6GPQ-P26J (“‘Given the 
large number of moving parts in each company’s calculations, true comparability across 
industry sector peer groups will be difficult to achieve. The resulting inability to perform 
portfolio-wide analyses may hinder widespread usage of the new data . . . .’”). 
 149.  “At least one survey reveals that about 90% of institutional investors view 
executives’ pay as excessive.” Fairfax, supra note 56, at 10. 
 150.  See Michael Chamberlain, Socially Responsible Investing: What You Need to 
Know, FORBES, Apr. 24, 2013, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/feeonlyplanner/2013/04/24/socially-responsible-investing-
what-you-need-to-know/, archived at http://perma.cc/89XW-G5M6 (“Socially Responsible 
Investing (SRI) is sometimes referred to as ‘sustainable’, ‘socially conscious’, ‘mission’,  
‘green’ or ‘ethical’ investing.  In general, socially responsible investors are looking to 
promote concepts and ideals that they feel strongly about.”).  Some states have even given 
socially conscious companies a distinct status.  See, e.g., H.B. 2239, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
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equity could be pivotal, especially now when the gap between the upper 
and middle class is larger than ever.151  Some economists argue the U.S. is 
facing a “record level of inequality of income from labor [] probably higher 
than in any other society at any time in the past, anywhere in the world . . . 
[due to] extremely high remunerations at the summit of the wage hierarchy, 
particularly among top managers of large firms . . . .”152  The U.S. has 
witnessed a particularly high increase in wealth disparity compared to its 
European counterparts.153  Thus, it is no surprise that American CEOs are 
commonly paid twice as much as foreign CEOs in similar industries,154 
“even though companies in other nations are as productive, as profitable, 
and face similar challenges.”155 
Stakeholders living in the same community as these companies may 
be concerned with pay ratios as well.  With localities giving ever-
increasing tax incentives to attract large corporations, “citizens who do not 
invest but simply live in an area where a company operates tax-free have 
 
(Wash. 2015), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2011-
12/Pdf/Bills/House%20Passed%20Legislature/2239-S.PL.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/3GE6-5JUZ (“In addition to the general social purpose set forth in . . . this 
act, every corporation governed by this chapter may have one or more specific social 
purposes for which the corporation is organized.”). 
 151.  See Richard Fry & Rakesh Kochhar, America’s Wealth Gap Between Middle-
Income and Upper-Income Families is Widest on Record, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Dec. 17, 
2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/17/wealth-gap-upper-middle-income/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/4XWC-3URW (“In 2013, the median wealth of the nation’s 
upper-income families ($639,400) was nearly seven times the median wealth of middle-
income families ($96,500), the widest wealth gap seen in 30 years when the Federal Reserve 
began collecting these data . . . .”).  See also Zanny Minton Beddoes, For Richer, For 
Poorer, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 2012, at 3 (“Disparities in wealth are less visible in 
Americans’ everyday lives today than they were a century ago. Even poor people have 
televisions, air conditioners and cars.  But appearances deceive.  The democratisation of 
living standards has masked a dramatic concentration of incomes over the past 30 years, on 
a scale that matches, or even exceeds, the first Gilded Age.”). 
 152.  THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE 21ST CENTURY 265, 298 (2013).  
 153.  See Max Fisher, Map: How the world’s countries compare on income inequality 
(the U.S. ranks below Nigeria), THE WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 27, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/09/27/map-how-the-worlds-
countries-compare-on-income-inequality-the-u-s-ranks-below-nigeria/, archived at 
https://perma.cc/2W4D-YMW4 (“The data offer a reminder that the United States might 
enjoy greater economic equality than much of the world, but it is at the bottom end of the 
developed world.”) 
 154.  “This is not because Americans at all levels earn more than their foreign 
counterparts; the margin is much smaller below the CEO level, and sometimes is negative.  
The proximate cause of American CEOs’ higher incomes is that . . . salaries are a much 
smaller fraction of their compensation than of foreign CEOs’ incomes—less than half—
with the rest consisting partly of bonuses but mainly of stock options.”  Posner, supra note 
13, at 1020-21. 
 155.  Ravenscroft, supra note 43, at 2.  
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interests in how firms pay their workers.”156  Because corporations often 
promise localities new jobs in return for tax deductions, stakeholders 
should know just how beneficial those jobs would be in their community.  
The implications are even political.  As money continues to play a larger 
role in the political arena, “[t]o the extent money carries political weight, 
we weaken the ability of a broad range of people to speak and be 
heard . . . .”157 
In light of these socioeconomic concerns, the rule could help 
shareholders and the public determine if an executive’s compensation 
package is excessive “with reference to an ethical concept of a ‘just’ 
reward . . . .”158  This concept would be based on notions of an acceptable 
ratio between the compensation of the executive and a median worker in 
the firm.  If a CEO earned, for example, 331 times the average American 
worker’s salary—what the average American CEO earned in 2013—the 
public may evaluate if the CEO’s contribution merits that compensation 
relative to the average worker’s.159  Many commenters hope the glaring 
discrepancies can, at the very least, spark a conversation in the 
boardroom.160  The public might also evaluate if said CEO can really 
contribute the equivalent of 331 average workers to shareholders.  Many 
proponents of the rule argue that “often CEOs are paid ‘for luck’” and 
others argue that CEO pay is more attributable to market trends rather than 
individual efforts.161 
Still, in order for stakeholders to make judgments based on some 
ethical concept of fair compensation, the pay ratio information must be 
meaningful.  One opponent of the rule highlighted how indiscriminate 
inputs can nullify the value of pay ratio information: 
[S]uppose there are two otherwise identical companies selling 
identical widgets and making the same amount of money and 
whose CEOs each earn $1 million.  The only difference is that 
 
 156.  Ravenscroft, supra note 43, at 3.  
 157.  Ravenscroft, supra note 43, at 2.  
 158.  Posner, supra note 13, at 1015. 
 159.  Dill, supra note 18. 
 160.  Greater public awareness may pressure directors to act.  See Pay Ratio Rule, supra 
note 4, at 50153 (“[S]ome commenters suggested that comparing the total compensation of 
the median employee and [CEO] . . . could provide insight into the effectiveness of board 
oversight and sound board governance.”); Victoria McGrane & Joann S. Lublin, SEC 
Approval of Pay-Gap Rule Sparks Concerns, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Aug. 5, 2015, at 
B3 (“Activist hedge funds have also been making an issue out of CEO pay, though from a 
different vantage point.  These investors, who take stakes in companies and push for 
financial or strategic changes, don’t have a populist take on compensation and generally are 
happy to compensate executives for market-beating results.  Rather, what concerns them is 
when CEOs are paid if they don’t, in the activist’s view, deliver for shareholders.”). 
 161.  Ravenscroft, supra note 43, at 2.  
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one company outsources its lower-wage manufacturing to a 
forced labor camp in North Korea, leaving only the most highly 
compensated technical and administrative employees in the 
company, who have a median compensation of $100,000.  The 
CEO to median pay ratio would be 10.0.  The other company did 
not outsource and has a median worker compensation of $50,000.  
This company has a CEO-to-median pay ratio of 20.0. Does this 
mean that the compensation of the CEO that did not outsource is 
twice as “excessive” as the compensation of the CEO that 
outsourced?162 
The example sheds light on the potential flaws in the pay ratio 
calculations and the undue burdens it could create for companies if 
stakeholders over rely on a simplistic measure in determining whether 
compensation levels are just. 
On the other hand, if the purpose of executive compensation is not 
about creating a just reward, but producing high-performing executives and 
reducing agency costs by aligning the goals of the executive with the goals 
of the shareholders, then a different analysis is required.  Under this view, 
it is less important for shareholders to measure the pay ratio between 
executives and their employees.  Instead, shareholders should compare the 
performance and pay of their CEO with that of other CEOs in the same 
market.  So long as the market dictates the value of high-quality CEOs, the 
compensation is acceptable.163  And if the board of directors believes 
increasing performance-based compensation is requisite to aligning 
executive interests with shareholders, shareholders should only concern 
themselves with the effectiveness of said incentives and not whether the 
compensation is just or deserved.164 
In predicting whether a pay ratio rule will curtail executive 
compensation, the best evidence lies with shareholders’ previous 
preferences, particularly with the SEC’s recent say-on-pay rule.  Although 
the rule is non-binding, it allows shareholders to voice their disapproval of 
 
 162.  Angel, supra note 103, at 3. 
 163.  See Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation: Hearing before the S. 
Committee on Finance, 107th Cong. 29 (2002) (statement of Ira T. Kay, Vice President and 
U.S. Practice Director for Executive Compensation, Watson, Wyatt Worldwide) (“The CEO 
labor market meets all of the criteria of any market, including independent supply and 
demand, transparency and liquidity.”). 
 164.  Fairfax, supra note 56, at 10-11 (“Whatever the causes, the pay-for-performance 
disconnect appears to be the primary driver of discontent over executive compensation. . . . 
[T]he primary reason shareholders give for rejecting a company’s pay package relates 
to pay-for-performance issues.  For example, shareholders rejected the pay arrangements at 
a company in which the CEO received a $6.7 million increase in pay while the company’s 
one-year shareholder return was negative 10.3% and its three-year return was negative 
30.6%.”).  
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a CEO’s compensation.  Surprisingly, only 2% of corporations putting 
forth a say-on-pay proposal have received less than 50% approval.165  
Though the increased disclosure and say-on-pay regulations were criticized 
for not having enough teeth, this would only explain the continued increase 
in executive compensation since its enactment.  A say-on-pay vote’s lack 
of force would not, however, explain the overwhelming acceptance by 
shareholders of current compensation levels.  The SEC’s recent 
implementation of Section 951’s say-on-pay rule seems to further endorse 
the current trend in executive compensation.  While many public comments 
advocated for greater say in executive compensation, shareholders may not 
be as willing to force these compensation changes.166  Even if increasing 
executive pay might seem unwarranted from a public policy perspective, 
shareholders could still approve increased compensation levels if they 
believe it helps to lower agency costs or retain effective leadership. 
There is a risk that disclosing pay ratio information could exacerbate 
the problem.  Though counterintuitive, disclosures have had this effect in 
the past.167  Industry-wide compensation figures shed light on the going rate 
of a qualified CEO for both shareholders and CEOs.  If the data shows a 
mean or median compensation, most CEOs will use that as their baseline 
and aim higher.  After all, CEOs are not going to admit that they are below 
 
 165.  Even though: 
Eighty-eight percent of companies received a >80% ‘For’ vote, 10% received a 50-80% 
‘For’ vote, and 2% received a <50% ‘For’ vote. . . . Average CEO target pay has risen from 
$3.5 million in 2009 to $5 million in 2013 . . . .  What is interesting is that the move toward 
performance-based [long-term incentive] compensation has been in addition to–not a 
replacement for–other types of pay, and it is primarily responsible for the increase in CEO 
target pay. 
Robin Ferracone, Proxy Season 2014: A Mid-Year Look at What’s Hot and What’s Not, 
FORBES, July 8, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/robinferracone/2014/07/08/proxy-
season-2014-a-mid-year-look-at-whats-hot-and-whats-not/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/868K-9X7N.  
 166.  Tens of thousands of commenters complained about recklessly excessive 
compensation packages for CEOs.  U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, COMMENTS ON PAY RATIO 
DISCLOSURE, https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713.shtml, archived at 
https://perma.cc/4WT7-D3SW (last updated Aug. 5, 2015).  See also Pay Ratio Disclosure 
Comment Letter Type L, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (last updated July 15, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-1571.htm, archived at 
https://perma.cc/MW6M-5NSJ (“Disclosing corporate pay disparities will discourage lavish 
CEO pay practices that reward recklessness and greed—and that fueled the 2008 economic 
crash.  Rein in corporate recklessness: Tell the Securities and Exchange Commission you 
support disclosure of corporate pay disparities.”). 
 167.  See Davidoff, supra note 116, at 624 (“But its effect has, it seems, not been to rein 
in executive pay. Indeed, some evidence, and intuition, supports the possibility that 
disclosure may have had the opposite effect.  Those who care about the disclosure the most 
may be CEOs and other executives. . . . Disclosure itself may have helped 
empower executives to demand higher pay packages, helping to push compensation up.”). 
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average and, therefore, deserve below average compensation.  With the 
mean or median compensation serving as the benchmark, one could see 
how compensation creeps higher, whether it is deserved or not.  When 
shareholders and CEOs view the data stating that CEOs earn on average 
331 times that of the median employee in their respective industry, they 
both are going to ask if the CEO really adds 331 times the value of a 
typical worker, but they may not necessarily come up with the same 
answer.  With recent CEO compensation figures showing a pay ratio of 
331-to-1,168 a CEO seeking a pay raise can leverage that information. 
C. Pay Ratio Information May Assist Shareholder Say-on-Pay Votes 
In 2011, the SEC implemented the say-on-pay vote required by Dodd-
Frank and started requiring publicly traded corporations to submit 
nonbinding shareholder votes on the firm’s executive compensation 
packages, including incentive-based stock-option plans.169  In addition, the 
SEC required companies to disclose the relationship between the 
compensation levels and the metrics used to determine the executives’ 
performance.170 
Many commenters assert that including pay ratio information in the 
proxy filings will help shareholders with say-on-pay voting.171  As one 
Connecticut investor commented, he and other investors “will be more 
efficiently able to review CEOs” because the pay ratio data will allow them 
to be “more engaged and better informed.”172  There is no doubt a pay ratio 
 
 168.  Dill, supra note 18.  
 169.  See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules for Say-on-Pay 
and Golden Parachute Compensation as Required Under Dodd-Frank Act (January 25, 
2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-25.htm, archived at 
https://perma.cc/835X-MYXD (“The SEC’s new rules specify that say-on-pay votes 
required under the Dodd-Frank Act must occur at least once every three years beginning 
with the first annual shareholders’ meeting taking place on or after Jan. 21, 2011.  
Companies also are required to hold a ‘frequency’ vote at least once every six years in order 
to allow shareholders to decide how often they would like to be presented with the say-on-
pay vote.”). 
 170.  See James F. Cotter et. al., The First Year of Say-on-Pay Under Dodd-Frank: An 
Empirical Analysis and Look Forward, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 967, 979 (2013) [hereinafter 
Cotter] (“In addition, the SEC required that companies disclose—in the next year’s 
CD&A—whether the board had considered the results of the shareholder say-on-pay vote as 
part of making its decisions about future pay levels and, if so, how the board did so.”). 
 171.  See Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50106 (“Some commenters in the pre-
proposing period suggested specifically that shareholders of public companies could use the 
pay ratio information, together with pay-versus-performance disclosure, to help inform their 
say-on-pay votes, which could also be a tool for shareholders to hold companies accountable 
for their CEO compensation.”)(footnote omitted).  
 172.  Letter from Steven Towns, Investor from Hartford, Connecticut, Comment Letter 
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is a convenient tool for evaluating CEO compensation.  Finding the same 
information through independent research may be impractical, particularly 
if one wants to find compensation data on smaller, lesser-known 
corporations.  While industry averages can be found, they would only be 
estimates for the pay of any specific company.  Even if a public corporation 
does release the necessary data, it could be time-consuming to find the 
information. 
Others, however, believe an overly simple ratio may encourage 
uninformed voting.173  Instead of educating the public, they argue it will 
create a “name-and-shame tactic” for special interest groups.174  All the 
while, the average registrant is paying $368,159 to find, verify, and 
disclose the pay ratio information.175  Ultimately, say-on-pay has brought 
little to no change to growing compensation for CEOs.176  While the ratio 
will add new eye-catching statistics for dissatisfied stakeholders, it is not 
significantly worse than the salary and bonus amounts that shareholders 
already see.  Furthermore, shareholders have already been able to use pay 
ratio estimates for say-on-pay votes in the past.  Interested stakeholders 
calculate ratio estimates on their own for some of the worst pay ratio 
offenders and distribute that information to the public.177 
 
on Pay Ratio Disclosure (Nov. 19, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-
317.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/6934-7NU3. 
 173.  See Letter from Tom Quaadman, V.P. of the Center for Capital Markets, Comment 
Letter on Pay Ratio Disclosure, at 6, (May 22, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-
10/s71410-46.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/5W8S-P5RM (“While objecting to merely 
asking firms for one more datum may seem petty to some, this piece of information will not 
help shed any further light on company performance, investor protection, or income 
inequality.  Whether a CEO makes 20, 200, or 2,000 times as much as the median 
compensation of the firm’s employees provides no particular insight whether a CEO or the 
median employee is fairly compensated.  In fact, such a statistic could present a 
fundamentally misleading portrait of CEO pay, particularly compared across industries.”). 
 174. See id. at 11 (“It seems that the point of forcing firms to calculate and publish the 
CEO - median worker compensation ratio is to generate outrage, hoping that it will provoke 
a lower ratio.  This name-and-shame tactic will most likely not change the behavior of 
companies, while forcing them to expend effort and resources to calculate a statistic that 
will be of no use to them, their boards, their shareholders, or investors.”). 
 175.  See supra Part II.  
 176.  See Cotter, supra note 170, at 970 (“In all, our findings suggest that the Dodd-
Frank say-on-pay mandate has not broadly unleashed shareholder opposition to executive 
pay at U.S. companies, as some proponents had hoped for.  Nonetheless, it has affected pay 
practices at outlier companies experiencing weak performance and high executive pay levels 
that are identified by proxy advisory firms like ISS.”). 
 177.  See Bonnie Kavoussi, 10 Companies where CEO Pay Is Seriously Out of Whack, 
HUFFINGTON POST, (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/11/ceo-
worker-pay-ratio_n_2259233.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4VAR-5WJ7 (“At some 
companies, CEO pay is especially out of whack, according to PayScale, which analyzed pay 
at the country’s 50 biggest public companies last year.  The compensation website compared 
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III. FAILURES OF THE PAY RATIO RULE 
Because the SEC plays a pivotal role in informing investors, there is a 
natural tendency for the public to assume any required disclosure, “simply 
by its nature of being disclosed, is important, relevant, and helpful.”178  
Therefore, it is imperative that the SEC’s pay ratio rule conveys accurate 
and meaningful information.  Otherwise, the information could arbitrarily 
harm corporations by misinforming shareholders. 
The SEC believed a capacious definition of employee would create a 
more meaningful disclosure for shareholders.179  Thus, “the final rule’s 
definition of ‘employee’ [will] include the full-time, part-time, seasonal, 
and temporary employees employed by the registrant or any of its 
consolidated subsidiaries.”180  Only “workers who provide services to the 
registrant or its consolidated subsidiaries as independent contractors or 
‘leased’ workers are excluded from the definition . . . .”181 
By including seasonal, temporary, and foreign workers, the SEC’s pay 
ratio creates a flawed picture of companies’ pay practices.  It makes the pay 
ratio data less useful for shareholders attempting to curtail excessive 
compensation levels and misleads public policy activists attempting to 
improve U.S. pay equity.182  Even the SEC recognized how these arbitrary 
inputs could significantly alter a company’s ratio and, therefore, perceived 
corporate excess.  The initial, proposed rule explained: 
[O]ne company might outsource the labor-related 
(manufacturing) aspects of its business to a third-party to focus 
on product innovation, while another company competing in the 
 
CEO pay to the median pay of the typical full-time worker to compile the list.  The entire 
methodology can be found at their website.”). 
 178.  Center on Executive Compensation, supra note 23, at 4. 
 179.  See Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50116 (“We believe that the ‘all employees of 
the issuer’ language in Section 953(b) is best implemented by including rather than 
excluding broad categories of employees.  Further, even assuming there was any ambiguity 
in the statutory language, we believe that a more inclusive approach better serves Section 
953(b)’s purpose of providing shareholders with additional information about a registrant’s 
compensation practices that can be used in making voting decisions on executive 
compensation because it results in a pay ratio that is more reflective of the actual 
composition of the registrant’s workforce.”). 
 180.  Id. at 50117. 
 181.  Id.  
 182.  See Center on Executive Compensation, supra note 23, at 15 (discussing arguments 
that the original statute is silent on the issue of whether foreign employees should be 
considered).  See also Letter from Catherine Dixon, Chair of the Federal Regulation of 
Securities Committee of the American Bar Association, Comment Letter on Pay Ratio 
Disclosure, at 9, (Mar. 7, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-957.pdf, 
archived at https://perma.cc/PX9C-G5VC [hereinafter Dixon] (discussing the Congressional 
intent in writing “all employees” into the statute).  
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same industry might choose to retain the labor aspect of its 
business.  To the extent that product innovation requires higher 
pay than manufacturing, the outsourcing company will have a 
lower pay ratio for the same [CEO] pay.183 
With companies utilizing different employment strategies, the ratios 
will differ and make precise comparability across companies less relevant.  
As the example above shows, it can even incentivize perverse employment 
structures, such as outsourcing low-cost labor jobs to third parties. 
The final rule does include modifications to lessen the burden for 
registrants with large foreign or temporary labor forces: (1) an exclusion 
for 5% of a registrant’s foreign workforce, (2) the ability to make cost-of-
living adjustments for foreign employees, and (3) granting registrants a 
three-month window from the completed fiscal year to calculate the ratio.184  
However, for reasons discussed below, these modifications are insufficient 
in improving the pay ratio data. Furthermore, the SEC failed to address 
problems with nonpermanent employees185 and the annualization of 
wages.186 
 
 183.  Proposed Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 8, at 60585.  
 184.  See Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50111 (“[T]he final rule permits registrants to 
exempt non-U.S. employees where these employees account for 5% or less of the 
registrant’s total U.S. and non-U.S. employees, with certain limitations.”); id. (“In 
identifying the median employee, whether using annual total compensation or any other 
compensation measure that is consistently applied to all employees included in the 
calculation, the registrant may, but is not required to, make cost-of-living adjustments for 
the compensation of employees in jurisdictions other than the jurisdiction in which the PEO 
resides so that the compensation is adjusted to the cost of living in the jurisdiction in which 
the PEO resides . . . .”); id. at 50119 (“[T]he final rule defines ‘employee’ as an individual 
employed on any date of the registrant’s choosing within the last three months of the 
registrant’s last completed fiscal year.”). 
 185.  See id. at 50117 (“We believe this statutory language indicates that Congress 
intended the final rule to include all types of a registrant’s employees, including part-time, 
seasonal, and temporary workers, and we do not think it is appropriate to provide a 
wholesale exemption for those broad categories of employees that are not employed full-
time.  Any such exemption would risk producing pay ratio disclosure that is significantly 
different than the pay ratio disclosure that Congress expressly directed us to require when it 
said ‘all employees.’”). 
 186.  See id. at 50129 (“Annualization involves taking the compensation of an employee 
who worked for only part of the registrant’s fiscal year and projecting that compensation as 
if the employee worked the full fiscal year at the schedule that the employee worked for the 
portion of the year the employee worked. Annualization is allowed under the rule for full-
time and part-time employees who did not work for the registrant’s full fiscal year for some 
reason . . . . Annualization is only allowed for permanent employees; it is not allowed under 
the final rule for seasonal or temporary employees.”). 
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A. Including Nonpermanent Employees 
The pay ratio rule creates significant problems for companies that are 
dependent on seasonal and temporary workers (collectively “nonpermanent 
workers” or “nonpermanent employees”).  Including nonpermanent 
workers in the ratio could misrepresent compensation levels because 
nonpermanent workers are less likely to receive benefits, such as health 
insurance or company equity, than permanent workers.187  The data is 
further skewed if companies are not able to annualize the pay of non-
permanent workers as if they were employed on a year round basis.188  
Otherwise, temporary worker wage data will not be representative of the 
pay that workers actually earned from other employers during the year.189 
There are entire industries that face seasonal changes in demand.  
These companies often rely on temporary workers to contribute during 
peak seasons.190  The use of temporary workers allows these companies to 
expand their workforce for a short period of time and then contract it as 
demand subsides.  Retailers, in particular, rely on this employment strategy 
for the winter holidays.  However, because these temporary workers may 
only work for a few weeks or months, their compensation would inevitably 
be very low if it represented their only earnings for the entire year.  In 
reality, these workers know the positions are temporary and would likely 
find a new job once their employment ended.  Many of the temporary 
 
 187.  See Dixon, supra note 182, at 11 (“[T]hese employees are unlikely to be eligible to 
receive most types of variable compensation, such as annual bonuses and long-term 
incentive compensation (including equity compensation).  In addition, part-time employees 
often are ineligible to participate in a registrant’s health and welfare benefit programs.”).  
 188.  See Dixon, supra note 182, at 23 (“For purposes of comparing the total 
compensation of the principal executive officer to that of the “typical” employee, it is only 
logical that such a comparison should be made over a comparable time period.  Thus, the 
compensation of the comparators should be viewed on a full-time equivalency basis.”). 
 189.  Center on Executive Compensation, supra note 23, at 19-20 (“[T]he income that a 
part-time or seasonal employee receives from a single employer could give a significantly 
distorted picture of the employee’s annual income, if the employee also works for other 
employers in the course of the year, as part-time and seasonal workers often do.”). 
 190.  See Jay Greene, Amazon plans to hire, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 16, 2014, at A10, 
http://www.seattletimes.com/business/amazon-plans-to-add-80000-temps-for-the-holiday-
season/, archived at http://perma.cc/349L-8FAM (“To meet the demand for holiday orders, 
Amazon.com plans to hire 80,000 seasonal workers in the United States this holiday 
season, up 14 percent from a year ago.”).  See also Susan Adams, Who’s Hiring The Most, 
Holiday Season 2014, FORBES, Nov. 5, 2014, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2014/11/05/whos-hiring-the-most-holiday-season-
2014/, archived at http://perma.cc/9TNS-8KP8 (“[UPS will] hire as many as 95,000 
seasonal workers this year . . . . UPS, which only hired 50,000 seasonal workers last year 
and had trouble keeping up with the surging number of gifts that consumers ordered online, 
wound up repeatedly apologizing and issuing many refunds to customers.).   
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workers may also use the temporary position to supplement their 
permanent job.  Nevertheless, the pay ratio rule treats these employees as if 
they were permanent, yearlong employees, which significantly skews the 
actual compensation of these employees. 
One can look to Macy’s, Inc. for an illustration of how this method 
misrepresents a company’s compensation structure. According to Macy’s 
CEO Terry Lundgren, Macy’s department stores hired over 80,000 
temporary employees for the 2013 holiday season, which is a nearly 50% 
increase in its total number of associates.191  If one of these temporary 
employees works for one month, earning the same as the median Macy’s 
employee, their salary would be $2,416.192  Although this same employee 
may be earning much more than $2,900 a year through other part-time or 
full-time employment, Macy’s must report the employee’s annual salary as 
$2,900.  Including these temporary employees would likely increase 
Macy’s 345-to-1 pay ratio even further. 
The rule may force retail corporations, along with other industries 
with a high dependence on seasonal workers, to institute costlier, sub-
optimal employment strategies.193  Because pay ratio wage data is created 
from a snapshot of the company’s workforce, the rule could arbitrarily 
harm some companies more than others if they employ a large number of 
low-salaried or seasonal employees during that time.194  If a company’s 
employee makeup changes throughout the year, snapshots taken on 
different dates may create completely different ratios for the same 
 
 191.  Press Release, Macy’s, Inc., Macy’s, Inc. to Hire 86,000 Seasonal Associates in 
2014 (Sept. 29, 2014), http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=84477&p=irol-
newsArticle&cat=news&ID=1971706, archived at http://perma.cc/D33D-WM3N 
[hereinafter Macy’s].  “Seasonal associates at Macy’s and Bloomingdale’s serve customers 
on the selling floor, work in store operations positions, interact with customers via the 
telephone in call centers, and staff the distribution and fulfillment centers that coordinate 
shipments to stores and directly to customers who buy online or via mobile.” Id. 
 192.  Vivian Giang, 13 CEOs Who Get Paid Shockingly More than Their Employees, 
BUSINESS INSIDER, (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/ceos-who-get-paid-
much-more-than-workers-2013-3#terry-j-lundgren-gets-paid-345-times-more-than-the-
average-macys-employee-4, archived at http://perma.cc/4UL8-J34R. 
 193.  Letter from Korok Ray, Assistant Professor of Accounting, The George 
Washington University Regulatory Studies Center, Public Interest Comment on The 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s Proposed Rule: Pay Ratio Disclosure 17 (Dec. 2, 
2013), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-524.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/4DH2-A6DN (“The disclosure will hurt companies with large low-wage or 
seasonal work forces, for example food services and retail. . . . All of these will distort the 
firm’s behavior and ultimately change the competitive landscape since it will move the firm 
away from its optimal choice.”).  
 194.  See Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50119 (“A number of commenters contended 
that the final rule should allow registrants the flexibility to choose a calculation date within 
the registrant’s last fiscal year.”). 
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company.  This could incentivize unwanted behavior, such as restructuring 
employment contracts to reduce the numbers of low-salaried employees 
when the pay ratio is calculated. 
For example, companies like Macy’s that experience a fluctuating 
need for employees, use nonpermanent positions as a useful tool to attract 
workers.195  But, because independent contractors, leased workers, and 
temporary workers employed by third parties are not included in the 
ratio,196 companies seeking to reduce their ratio could lease temporary 
workers from contractors.  While this new incentive to reduce 
nonpermanent employees could translate into the creation of more full-time 
positions, it could also reduce the total number of positions available—
positions that, according to Macy’s CEO Terry Lundgren, “employ 
students working during break to help pay tuition, retirees seeking to 
remain active and individuals from many walks of life wanting to 
supplement their income.”197 
The final rule grants registrants greater flexibility than the SEC’s 
initial proposal, however, by allowing registrants to select a date to 
calculate wages that is within three months of their completed fiscal year, 
rather than mandating that it be on the last day of the fiscal year.198  For 
companies with short peak seasons, they can select a snapshot of employee 
data when their reliance on temporary workers is low.  But for companies 
with peak seasons longer than three months, the SEC’s solution offers little 
benefit.  A better solution is to allow companies to annualize the earnings 
of temporary workers. Macy’s could then report the salary of its temporary 
worker as $29,000 because that is the employee’s salary if extended over 
an entire year.  However, as discussed in the section below, the SEC 
disagreed. 
 
 195.  See Letter from Michael Aitken, VP of Government Affairs, Society for Human 
Resource Management, Comment Letter on Pay Ratio Disclosure 3 (Dec. 30, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-720.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/K5K5-
RAJC [hereinafter Aitken] (“In many industries, a particular business strategy requires the 
use of non-full-time employees.  In other cases, an employer may determine that, in order to 
attract and retain employees, it is beneficial to offer compensation structures that differ from 
a traditional full-time employment position.”).  
 196.  Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50117. (“[W]orkers who provide services to the 
registrant or its consolidated subsidiaries as independent contractors or ‘leased’ workers are 
excluded from the definition as long as they are employed, and their compensation is 
determined, by an unaffiliated third party.”).  
 197.  Macy’s, supra note 191.  
 198.  See Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50119 (“Only a few commenters . . . supported 
using the last day of the fiscal year calculation date.”). 
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B. Prohibition on the Annualization of Wages 
Permitting annualization for only full-time employees could 
disadvantage registrants that rely on a large part-time workforce.  Some 
industries require part-time workers as part of their particular business 
strategy.199  Registrants that require large numbers of temporary employees 
during certain parts of the year, such as holiday seasons, could also be 
unreasonably disadvantaged.200 
The SEC wants to ensure that companies do not inflate the median 
workers’ pay by annualizing the compensation data of seasonal and 
temporary employees.201  The final rule only permits companies to 
annualize the compensation of employees where the employment 
relationship is permanent.202  Instances where employees did not work for 
the full fiscal year because they were a new hire or because of a leave of 
absence, could be annualized, so long as companies use this method 
consistently.203  Additionally, part-time employees can only have their 
 
 199.  A Wal-Mart VP memo leaked in 2005 suggested the increase in part-time 
employees occurred in order to decrease healthcare costs.  See Memorandum to Wal-Mart 
Board of Directors from Susan Chambers, Exec. VP of People, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
Reviewing and Revising Wal-Mart’s Benefits Strategy 10, 
http://www.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/26walmart.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/6VQV-CEDX (“These initiatives include reducing the number of labor 
hours per store, increasing the percentage of part-time Associates in stores, and increasing 
the number of hours per Associate. These changes represent a major cost-savings 
opportunity with relatively little impact on existing Associates. The most significant 
challenge here is that the shift to more part-time Associates will lower Wal-Mart’s 
healthcare enrollment (even with the more generous part-time offering outlined above), 
which could have an impact on public reputation.”). 
 200.  Aitken, supra note 195, at 3 (“If an accommodation for annualizing non-full-time 
employee compensation is not included in the final rule, the result will be skewed pay ratio 
data for employers who require an increased number of employees at certain points during 
the year, or those employers who have emphasized certain benefits through part-time 
employment positions.”). 
 201.  For example, “a retailer that hires a seasonal worker at minimum wage for three 
months during the holiday season would need to calculate annual total compensation for that 
employee as three months at $7.25/hour ($3,480) and could not “annualize” the wages as if 
the seasonal worker was paid for a full twelve months of work ($13,920).”  Proposed Pay 
Ratio Rule, supra note 8, at 60569.  However, if that same employee was terminated before 
the last day of the retailer’s fiscal year, the retailer would exclude the employee’s 
compensation from its calculation.  Id. 
 202.  Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50108 (“[A] registrant would be permitted, but not 
required, to annualize the total compensation for a permanent employee who was employed 
at yearend but did not work for the entire year.”).  
 203.  See Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50129 (“Annualization is allowed under the 
rule for full-time and part-time employees who did not work for the registrant’s full fiscal 
year for some reason, such as they were employees who were newly hired, on leave under 
the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, called for active military duty, or took an 
ARTICLE 5 (YINGLING) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/7/16  3:00 PM 
2015] PAY RATIO DISCLOSURE  249 
 
compensation annualized as part-time employees, and not to a full-time 
equivalent.204 
If the purpose of the pay ratio rule is to provide accurate and 
comparable measures of a company’s pay practices, the Commission must 
allow enough flexibility in the rule to incorporate alternative employment 
structures.  Some industries face high employee turnover, either because 
the company purposefully creates temporary positions as part of a larger 
employment strategy or because employees in that industry tend to move 
between jobs frequently.  Either way, entire industries should not be 
punished for exercising efficient employment practices that allow for much 
needed workforce flexibility. 
C. Requiring an Unadjusted Ratio for Foreign Employees 
The SEC originally banned cost-of-living adjustments to the pay ratio 
for non-U.S. workers, concerned that it would “diminish the potential 
usefulness of the disclosure.”205  But in the final rule, the Commission 
changed its stance, acknowledging: 
[T]hat differences in the underlying economic conditions of the 
countries in which registrants operate likely have an effect on the 
compensation paid to employees in those jurisdictions.  As a 
result, requiring registrants to determine their median employee 
and calculate the pay ratio without permitting them to adjust for 
these different underlying economic conditions could result in 
what some would consider a statistic that does not appropriately 
reflect the value of the compensation paid to individuals in those 
countries.206 
The final rule allows for registrants to make cost-of-living 
adjustments, so long as registrants “briefly describe any cost-of-living 
adjustments they used . . . disclose the country in which the median 
employee is located,” and disclose an unadjusted ratio as well.207  For 
example, registrants could adjust foreign compensation through purchasing 
power parity208 statistics.209  While this compromise improves the pay ratio 
 
unpaid leave of absence during the period.”).  
 204.  Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50129 (defining annualization for part time 
employees as “projecting that compensation as if the employee worked the full fiscal year at 
the schedule that the employee worked for the portion of the year the employee worked”).   
 205.  Proposed Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 8, at 60569.  
 206.  Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50125. 
 207.  Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50126. 
 208.  See Rudiger Dornbusch, Purchasing Power Parity, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 1591, 1985), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/jfrankel/ITF-
220/readings/Dornbush-PPP-NBERWP1591.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7Z25-RY8N 
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accuracy of large, multinational corporations, it still creates regulatory 
burdens and attaches a skewed, unadjusted ratio to a registrant’s disclosure. 
Though some proponents of the rule hope including foreign worker 
information in the unadjusted ratio may incentivize firms to reduce 
outsourced employment, the unadjusted pay ratio will likely arbitrarily 
harm the reputations of companies or industries with a large multinational 
workforce in countries with lower costs of living.  Because of the varying 
forms of in kind compensation and constant market fluctuations, any 
attempt to standardize compensation is unlikely to accurately convey its 
local value.  These wide discrepancies, in turn, distort the comparability of 
ratios, making such information much less useful to shareholders.210  The 
Bureau of Labor Statistics collected data on worldwide hourly direct pay in 
the manufacturing industry in 2010.  Converted to U.S. dollars, it “showed 
an hourly wage of $1.13 in China (2009 data) and $.82 in India vs. $6.81 in 
Brazil and $16.03 in Israel . . . .”211  In the US, the rate was $26.26.212  
Almost as enlightening as the Bureau’s data on global pay discrepancies 
was the Bureau’s concern with comparing international wages.  The study 
noted there were several data gaps and methodological restraints that 
hindered their precision.213  For example, many foreign workers receive 
 
(“Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is a theory of exchange rate determination. It asserts (in 
the most common form) that the exchange rate change between two currencies over any 
period of time is determined by the change in the two countries’ relative price levels.”).   
 209.  The SEC has made a complete 180 degree turn on this issue. See Proposed Pay 
Ratio Rule, supra note 8, at 60569 (“[A]djusting for these variables could distort an 
understanding of the registrant’s compensation practices.  For example, if a registrant with a 
workforce primarily located in jurisdictions with a lower cost of living than the United 
States adjusted the annual total compensation of those employees using purchasing power 
parity statistics, the median of the annual total compensation of all its employees would 
likely increase.”).  But see Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50111, 50112 n.63 (“The 
registrant is also required to briefly describe the cost-of-living adjustments it used . . . . For 
example, registrants may use cost-of-living adjustments based on purchasing power parity 
(“PPP”) conversion factors. A PPP conversion factor is the ratio of PPP exchange rate to the 
nominal exchange rate.”). 
 210.  Opponents believe the “statute is silent on whether ‘all employees’ refers to all 
employees in the U.S. or worldwide.” Center on Executive Compensation, supra note 23, at 
15. Furthermore, they point to the “well-established presumption against the 
extraterritoriality of U.S. laws . . . ,” id.  
 211.  Center on Executive Compensation, supra note 23, at 15.  
 212.  Center on Executive Compensation, supra note 23, at 15-16.  
 213.  Center on Executive Compensation, supra note 23, at 16 (“It is worth noting that 
the [Bureau of Labor Statistics] itself explicitly states that it is unable to directly compare 
wages in China and India to wages in other countries, due to ‘various data gaps and 
methodological issues,’ and goes so far as to present these wages completely separately 
from its other international data.  While the issues inherent in the gathering of statistical data 
may not directly correlate to the gathering of corporate wage data, we highlight this 
discrepancy as an example of how significantly data can differ from country to country and 
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employment benefits as part of their compensation.  These employers 
deduct salary in return for in kind compensation, such as healthcare, 
retirement, housing, or childcare assistance.214  Similarly, some employees 
may augment their base salary by engaging in profit-sharing arrangements 
that account for much of the employee’s compensation.215  Another variable 
influencing wage ratios are currency exchange rates. Rates may change 
year to year because of global market conditions, altering a registrant’s 
ratio without any change in corporate practices.216  Therefore, retrieving 
data on just base salaries will not provide a full picture. Yet, trying to 
create a methodology that incorporates in kind compensation is costly and 
potentially inaccurate. 
In its final rule, the SEC also included an exemption for up to 5% of 
foreign employees for the unadjusted ratio.217  Though the SEC 
acknowledged “the inclusion of non-U.S. employees would raise 
compliance costs for multinational companies, would introduce cross-
border compliance issues, could raise additional comparability concerns, 
and could have an adverse impact on competition,” its meager 5% 
exclusion is not enough to mitigate these concerns.218  The exemption only 
helps “address the payroll or other data challenges that may arise for 
registrants with a small percentage of non-U.S. employees.”219  Though 
registrants can still supply shareholders with multiple ratios to eliminate 
100% of foreign employee data, providing multiple ratios discredits the 
 
how meaningless a statistic which simply combines them is.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 214.  Dixon, supra note 182, at 10 (“In our experience, compensation arrangements 
outside the United States vary widely based on such diverse factors as government-
mandated benefits, foreign labor law requirements, prevailing wage standards and the 
difficulty in providing equity compensation because of the limitations contained in the 
applicable securities, tax, and other laws.  For example, foreign employees may receive 
ancillary benefits of a significantly greater value than U.S.-based employees who perform 
equivalent functions, due to Works Council requirements and/or mandatory employer 
contributions to pay for employee benefits that, in the United States, are funded by the 
employees themselves.”).  
 215.  Aitken, supra note 195, at 2 (“[E]mployers might provide profit-sharing 
arrangements to employees that might not be comparable with traditional concepts of U.S. 
base compensation.”).   
 216.  Center on Executive Compensation, supra note 23, at 18 (“All data collected from 
foreign countries will need to be converted to U.S. dollars by the corporate HR team 
responsible for aggregating the data.  This will require collecting an exchange rate based on 
the date of record for pay data provided by each country. Where different countries have 
chosen different dates of record, the exchange rates will not be consistent.  Further, currency 
exchange may fluctuate significantly from year to year . . . .”).  
 217.  See Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50111 (discussing Non-U.S. Employee 
Exemptions and Additional Permitted Disclosures).  
 218.  Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50110.  
 219.  Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50124.  
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value of the ratios and potentially confuses shareholders.  If the goal of 
disclosure is to provide investors with material information, requiring an 
unadjusted ratio that includes foreign employees (even 95% of them) 
hampers that objective. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Many opponents of the pay ratio rule argue that the potential gains of 
the rule, if any, do not justify its burdensome costs.  They also believe 
different calculation methods would reduce costs while still remaining 
faithful to Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Ultimately, the goal of the rule is to provide shareholders with more 
information to better evaluate firms and improve the pay of hardworking 
employees or, at the very least, curb the excess compensation of corporate 
management.  While any rule may have failed to curtail the ever-increasing 
limits of executive compensation, the SEC squandered any chance it did 
have by including too many environment- and industry- specific factors 
that distort the pay ratio.  Though “[f]inancial reports . . . are supposed to 
include the good, the bad, and the ugly,” without such corrections, pay ratio 
comparability is ineffective and misleading.220  Though firms should be 
forced to answer “for paying CEOs more in this country than they are paid 
in other countries [and] more in this era than they were paid relative to 
average workers forty years ago,” the rule fails to expose the firms 
deserving of such pointed inquiries.221  Worse, by creating a pay ratio rule, 
the “Commission creates a preconceived bias that the pay ratio provides 
useful information . . . .”222  Although registrants can explain many of these 
flaws, a simple ratio is much more palatable for shareholders than lengthy 
clarifications.  Thus, the rule destroys its own effectiveness by including 
overly expansive information, harms companies by misleading investors, 
and leads to negative corporate practices through misguided incentives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 220.  Ravenscroft, supra note 43.  
 221.  Ravenscroft, supra note 43.  
 222.  Center on Executive Compensation, supra note 23, at 4. 
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V. APPENDIX 
Table 1: Total Initial Compliance Cost Estimates for Affected 
Registrants223 
 
Type of registrant  Estimates  Calculation  
Registrants with foreign operations  
Registrants affected  1,470   
Total number of 
employees  
27,595,305   
Cost / employee ratio  $38.04   
Total cost  $1,049,725,402  27,595,305*$38.04  
  
Average cost per 
registrant  
$714,099  $1,049,725,402 / 1,470  
Registrants with U.S.-based operations only  
Registrants affected  793   
Total number of 
employees  
6,522,626   
Cost / employee ratio  $19.02  $38.04*(1-0.5)  
Total cost  $124,060,347  6,522,626*$19.02  
Average cost per 
registrant  
$156,444  $124,060,347 / 793  
 
 223.  See Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 4, at 50160-61.   
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Median cost per 
registrant  
$27,008.40  This number 
represents the median 
of (number of 
employees * $19.02) 
across the 793 U.S.-
based registrants  
Registrants with missing data, reclassified as registrants with 
U.S.-based operations only  
Registrants affected  1,308     
Registrants with 
available employee 
data  
973   
Total number of 
employees for the 973 
registrants  
6,932,754   
Cost / employee ratio  $19.02  $38.04*(1-0.5)  
Total cost for the 973 
registrants  
$131,860,981  6,932,754*$19.02  
Registrants with no 
employee data  
335  1,308 – 973  
Total cost for the 335 
registrants  
$9,047,814  
   
335 * $27,008.4  
Total cost  $140,908,795  131,860,981+9,047,81
4  
TOTAL  $1,314,694,544  
   
$1,049,725,402 
+$124,060,347              
+ $140,908,795  
 
